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THE JURISPRUDENCE OF DIGNITY

LESLIE MELTZER HENRY

†

Few words play a more central role in modern constitutional law without
appearing in the Constitution than “dignity.” The term appears in more than
nine hundred Supreme Court opinions, but despite its popularity, dignity is a
concept in disarray. Its meanings and functions are commonly presupposed
but rarely articulated. The result is a cacophony of uses so confusing that some
critics argue the word ought to be abandoned altogether.
This Article fills a void in the literature by offering the first empirical study
of Supreme Court opinions that invoke dignity and then proposing a typology
of dignity based on an analysis of how the term is used in those opinions. The
study reveals three important findings. First, the Court’s reliance on dignity is
increasing, and the Roberts Court is accelerating that trend. Second, in contrast to its past use, dignity is now as likely to be invoked by the more conservative Justices on the Court as by their more liberal counterparts. Finally, the
study demonstrates that dignity is not one concept, as other scholars have theorized, but rather five related concepts.
The typology refers to these conceptions of dignity as institutional status as
dignity, equality as dignity, liberty as dignity, personal integrity as dignity, and collective virtue as dignity. This Article traces each type of dignity
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to its epistemic origins and describes the substantive dignitary interests each protects. Importantly, the typology offers more than a clarification of the conceptual
chaos surrounding dignity. It provides tools to track the Court’s use of different
types of dignity over time. This permits us to detect doctrinally transformative
moments, in such areas as state sovereign immunity and abortion jurisprudence,
that arise from shifting conceptions of dignity.
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INTRODUCTION
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., frequently emphasized that the
fundamental value at the crux of American law is “the constitutional
1
ideal of human dignity.” He believed that the Constitution, and particularly the Bill of Rights, expressed a “bold commitment by a people
2
to the ideal of dignity protected through law.” Perhaps to give doctrinal heft to a word that appears nowhere in the Constitution, Justice
Brennan invoked “dignity” in an astounding thirty-nine opinions dur3
ing his tenure on the Court. Despite the breadth of cases to which he
4
applied the term, Brennan’s tireless efforts to advance a legal notion
of dignity often were discounted either because the term appeared in
5
his dissenting opinions, or because when dignity appeared in the majority opinions Brennan authored, his opinions represented the “lib6
eral wing” of the Court’s jurisprudence.
After a brief period of hibernation during the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, the use of dignity is once again on the rise. The Roberts
7
Court has issued opinions that invoke dignity in thirty-four cases,
8
nearly half of those in the last two Terms alone. We would be mista1

Bernard Schwartz, How Justice Brennan Changed America, in REASON AND PASSION:
JUSTICE BRENNAN’S ENDURING INFLUENCE 31, 41 (E. Joshua Rosenkranz & Bernard
Schwartz eds., 1997); see also In Search of the Constitution: Mr. Justice Brennan (PBS television broadcast Apr. 16, 1987) (interview by Bill Moyers) (highlighting in an interview
with Justice Brennan the importance of human dignity in constitutional jurisprudence).
2
William J. Brennan, Jr., My Life on the Court, in REASON AND PASSION, supra note
1, at 17, 18.
3
For a list of these opinions, see infra Appendix Tables 1a-1c. Several footnotes
throughout this Article refer the reader to the Appendix, which includes tables listing
cases. These cases have been culled from the Supreme Court Dignity Database, a database I created that includes all Supreme Court opinions invoking the word “dignity.”
After analyzing the use of dignity in each opinion, I created the typology and categorized the various uses accordingly. For each use of dignity, the database also tracks the
Justice invoking the term; whether the opinion is a majority, dissent, or concurrence;
the subject matter of the case; and the Court’s final vote.
4
See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984) (finding that sex discrimination “deprives persons of their individual dignity”); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 264-65 (1970) (explaining that “from its founding” the United States has attempted “to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within its borders,” particularly the poor); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (noting that the
purpose of the Fourth Amendment “is to protect personal privacy and dignity”).
5
Fewer than one-third of Justice Brennan’s invocations of dignity appear in majority opinions. See infra Appendix Table 1a.
6
Schwartz, supra note 1, at 31.
7
For a list of these cases, see infra Appendix Table 2.
8
In the 2009 and 2010 Terms, Justices on the Court invoked dignity in sixteen
cases. See id.
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ken, however, to see this as a reascendance of Justice Brennan’s “dignity.” To the contrary, dignity is now more likely to appear in majority
9
than in dissenting opinions, and as likely to be invoked by Justice Sca10
lia as by Justice Ginsburg.
11
Dignity’s increasing popularity, however, does not signal agreement about what the term means. Instead, its importance, meaning,
and function are commonly presupposed but rarely articulated. As a
result, contrasting views about dignity’s definition, usefulness, and ul12
timate purpose have emerged.
For some commentators, dignity is nothing less than “the premier
value underlying the last two centuries of moral and political
13
14
thought,” an essential “basis of human rights,” and one of “those
15
very great political values that define our constitutional morality.”
Like Justice Brennan, legal theorist Ronald Dworkin has declared that
“the principles of human dignity . . . are embodied in the Constitution
16
and are now common ground in America.”
Indeed, few concepts dominate modern constitutional jurispru17
dence more than dignity does without appearing in the Constitution.
The Supreme Court has invoked the term in connection with the
9

Compare infra Figure 2 (showing that roughly three percent of dissenting opinions currently invoke dignity), with infra Figure 3 (demonstrating that nearly four
percent of majority opinions currently invoke dignity).
10
Since Justice Ginsburg joined the Court in 1993, she and Justice Scalia have
each authored eleven opinions that invoke dignity.
11
See infra Figure 1.
12
See, e.g., Leslie A. Meltzer, Book Review, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 660, 660-61
(2008) (reviewing HUMAN DIGNITY AND BIOETHICS: ESSAYS COMMISSIONED BY THE
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS (2008)) (critiquing a collection of essays on dignity and calling for a less ideologically driven approach to defining dignity).
13
Hugo Adam Bedau, The Eighth Amendment, Human Dignity, and the Death Penalty,
in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 145, 145
(Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992).
14
Alan Gewirth, Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION OF
RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 10, 28.
15
William A. Parent, Constitutional Values and Human Dignity, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 47, 71.
16
Ronald Dworkin, Three Questions for America, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 21, 2006, at
24, 26; see also RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 191-218, 255-75 (2011)
(exploring the meaning of dignity).
17
The Court invokes privacy frequently, but unlike its use of dignity, the Court has
determined that the Constitution affirmatively protects a right of privacy. See, e.g.,
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (finding a right to marital privacy). Moreover, the privacy right established in Griswold has been extended by numerous Supreme Court cases, including Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973), wherein the
Court held that the right to privacy encompassed the right to an abortion.
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19

20

21

First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth,
25
26
teenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.
18

22

Ninth,

173
23

Eleventh,

24

Four-

See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (“The constitutional right
of free expression . . . is designed and intended to remove governmental restraints
from the arena of public discussion . . . in the belief that no other approach would
comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political
system rests.”); see also Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116, 123 (1991) (holding a “Son of Sam” law unconstitutional
as burdening speech based on subject matter and quoting Cohen to show that governmental restraint of free speech in the political arena is incompatible with individual
dignity); Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448-49 (1991) (quoting Cohen for the
proposition that dignity is at the root of First Amendment protections); cf. Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 757-58 (1985) (weighing
First Amendment expression against the “essential dignity” of all persons to protect
their reputation (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974))).
19
See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006) (explaining that one
purpose of the knock-and-announce rule is to protect “dignity that can be destroyed by
a sudden entrance”); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1989)
(stating that the Fourth Amendment “guarantees the privacy, dignity, and security of
persons against certain arbitrary and invasive acts by officers of the Government”);
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760, 766-67 (1985) (holding that a person cannot be
compelled by the state to undergo surgery to remove a bullet linked to a crime because
such an act would be an unwarranted intrusion on personal dignity); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952) (overturning a drug conviction on the basis that the
police’s decision to pump the defendant’s stomach against his will to acquire evidence
was “offensive to human dignity”); cf. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149,
152 (2004) (noting that “some level of suspicion in the case of highly intrusive searches
of the person” is warranted due to “dignity and privacy interests,” whereas searches of
vehicles do not prompt the same concerns).
20
See, e.g., Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985) (finding that successive prosecutions by two states do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the defendant violated the “‘peace and dignity’ of two sovereigns” in one act (quoting United
States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922))); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88,
107 (1976) (requiring, under the Due Process Clause, that “aliens be treated with the
same dignity and respect accorded to other persons”); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 460 (1966) (“[T]he constitutional foundation underlying the privilege [against
self-incrimination] is the respect a government . . . must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens.”).
21
See, e.g., Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) (“[A] right of selfrepresentation at trial will not ‘affirm the dignity’ of a defendant who lacks the mental
capacity to conduct his defense without the assistance of counsel.” (quoting McKaskle
v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176-77 (1984))); McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 176-77 (“The right to
appear pro se exists to affirm the dignity and autonomy of the accused . . . .”) (emphasis omitted)); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975) (affirming the right to appear pro se but stating that it “is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom”).
22
See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419-20 (2008) (restricting the imposition of capital punishment to a narrow range of cases based on “[e]volving standards of decency” that “express respect for the dignity of the person”); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005) (setting aside the death sentence of a juvenile under
the age of eighteen and noting that “the Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of the
government to respect the dignity of all persons”); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738
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Other scholars and jurists, however, view dignity as a concept in
27
Philosopher Ruth Macklin considers dignity “a useless concrisis.
cept” because it does nothing more than offer “vague restatements

(2002) (finding that handcuffing a prisoner to a hitching post in the sun for seven
hours violated the “basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment[, which] is nothing less than the dignity of man” (alteration in original) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986) (plurality opinion) (prohibiting the execution of mentally ill persons and explaining that the Eighth Amendment “protect[s] the
dignity of society itself from the barbarity of exacting mindless vengeance”); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 158, 173, 207 (1976) (plurality opinion) (upholding the death
penalty of an individual convicted of murder but noting that the Eighth Amendment
requires penalties to be in accord with “the dignity of man” (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at
100) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 285
(1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (commenting that “the State may not inflict punishments that do not comport with human dignity” under the Eighth Amendment).
23
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965) (granting the “same
dignity,” or status, to privacy as it had previously given to other “peripheral rights”).
24
See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002)
(describing states as having “dignity that is consistent with their status as sovereign entities”); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (recognizing that states “retain the
dignity, though not the full authority, of sovereignty”).
25
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567, 578-79 (2003) (overturning Texas’s antisodomy statute on the ground that “adults may choose” to engage in same-sex
relationships and still “retain their dignity as free persons”); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129, 142 (1994) (ruling gender-based juror exclusion criteria unconstitutional and asserting that the criteria “denigrate[] the dignity of the excluded
juror”); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (plurality
opinion) (characterizing “personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child-rearing, and education” as “central to personal dignity and autonomy”); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)
(plurality opinion) (determining that a minority set-aside program implicates the right
“to be treated with equal dignity and respect”); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986) (“Few decisions are . . . more basic to
individual dignity and autonomy, than a woman’s decision . . . whether to end her
pregnancy.”); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1970) (“From its founding the
Nation’s basic commitment has been to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons
within its borders.”).
26
See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000) (invalidating a Hawaiian racebased voting statute because “it demeans the dignity and worth of a person to be
judged by ancestry”).
27
For a review of the main criticisms of dignity, see Gerhold K. Becker, In Search of
Humanity: Human Dignity as a Basic Moral Attitude, in THE FUTURE OF VALUE INQUIRY
53, 53 (Matti Häyry & Tuija Takala eds., 2001), which describes claims that dignity is an
“empty formula without precise content,” a “rhetorical device,” and a “conversation
stopper.” Similar arguments have been leveled against the concept of equality. See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 547 (1982) (arguing that
the rhetoric of equality should be abandoned because the principle of equality lacks
content).
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28

of . . . more precise . . . notions.” Law and ethics professor John Harris echoes Macklin’s concern, pointing out that the word is “universally
29
attractive” because it is “comprehensively vague.” Meanwhile, philosopher Helga Kuhse contends that as long as dignity is invoked by
30
people on opposite sides of a debate it is “nothing more than a short31
hand expression for people’s moral intuitions and feelings.”
Despite deep disagreement about its normative, practical, and jurisprudential value, dignity’s growing presence in Supreme Court de32
cisions has received scant attention. The literature on dignity is pri28

Ruth Macklin, Dignity Is a Useless Concept, 327 BMJ 1419, 1419 (2003). But see
Suzy Killmister, Dignity: Not Such a Useless Concept, 36 J. MED. ETHICS 160, 160 (2010)
(challenging Macklin’s claim that dignity is “a useless concept” and arguing that dignity can “serve as a guiding principle in medical ethics”).
29
John Harris, Cloning and Human Dignity, 7 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS
163, 163 (1998) (Eng.).
30
For example, people on both sides of the debate about the morality and legality
of physician-assisted suicide appeal to dignity. Daniel P. Sulmasy, Dignity and Bioethics:
History, Theory, and Selected Applications, in HUMAN DIGNITY AND BIOETHICS: ESSAYS
COMMISSIONED BY THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS 469, 469 (2008). Proponents argue that individuals with prolonged suffering at the end of life experience a
loss of dignity that warrants physician-assisted suicide. See, e.g., Jyl Gentzler, What Is
Death with Dignity?, 28 J. MED. & PHIL. 461, 461-80 (2003) (exploring the ways in which
advocates of physician-assisted suicide invoke dignity). By contrast, opponents contend that the practice fails to properly respect the dignity of human life in every form.
See, e.g., Leon R. Kass, Defending Human Dignity (explaining that those who reject physician-assisted suicide do so because “every still-living human being, regardless of condition” has dignity), in HUMAN DIGNITY AND BIOETHICS, supra at 297, 304-05.
31
Helga Kuhse, Is There a Tension Between Autonomy and Dignity?, in 2 BIOETHICS
AND BIOLAW 61, 72 (Peter Kemp et al. eds., 2000). Echoing a similar sentiment, South
African law professor and judge Dennis Davis has remarked that dignity is “a piece of
jurisprudential Legoland—to be used in whatever form and shape is required by the
demands of the judicial designer.” D.M. Davis, Equality: The Majesty of Legoland Jurisprudence, 116 S. AFR. L.J. 398, 413 (1999).
32
Most scholarship on the Court’s use of dignity focuses on the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See Ann Althouse, On Dignity and Deference: The Supreme Court’s New
Federalism, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 245, 250-56, 265 (2000) (criticizing the Court’s use of
dignity in justifying state sovereign immunity and arguing instead that the Court focus
on practical liability concerns to defend the doctrine); Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye
Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55
STAN. L. REV. 1921, 1934-54, 1960-63 (2003) (discussing how dignity has increasingly
been used in reference to personal dignity and how this trend challenges the use of
institutional dignity to support state sovereignty); Peter J. Smith, States as Nations: Dignity in Cross-Doctrinal Perspective, 89 VA. L. REV. 1, 10, 51, 106-07 (2003) (claiming that
the Court’s state dignity jurisprudence maintains an “implicit reliance” on the doctrine
of foreign state sovereign immunity and contending that the Court should make this
reliance explicit). Notable exceptions, though, do exist. See Gewirth, supra note 14, at
10, 28 (examining whether there is a right to dignity in the United States); Reva B.
Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/ Carhart, 117
YALE L.J. 1694, 1702 (2008) (illustrating the ways in which dignity “bridges communi-
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marily written by philosophers and theologians, who discuss dignity as
33
a moral value divorced from legal application, or by international
and comparative law scholars, who examine dignity’s role in human
34
rights declarations and in foreign laws. The prominence of dignity
in American constitutional law has gone largely unanalyzed. This
leaves us without a comprehensive understanding of why the Court
has embraced dignity, what types of actions threaten dignity, and how
the Court weighs dignity in relation to other values. Most importantly,
we lack a systematic account of dignity’s varied meanings against
which to ponder these questions.
This Article has two related ambitions, both directed at clarifying
the conceptual chaos surrounding dignity’s complicated usage. The
first goal is to provide an approach that captures the range of ways in
ties” divided by the abortion debate); Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and Defamation: The Visibility of Hate, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1596, 1612-14 (2010) (defending group defamation
laws for the role they play in affirming the equal dignity of persons); Jeremy Waldron,
Dignity, Rank, and Rights 10-12, 22-29 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Research Paper Series Working Paper No. 09-50, 2009), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1461220# [hereinafter Waldron, Dignity, Rank,
and Rights] (presenting a conception of dignity that views all humans as possessing
high status in relation to law).
33
Over the years, philosophers have extensively examined dignity in this context.
See generally THOMAS E. HILL, JR., DIGNITY AND PRACTICAL REASON IN KANT’S MORAL
THEORY (1992); Aurel Kolnai, Dignity, 51 PHILOSOPHY 251 (1976) (Eng.); Michael J.
Meyer, Dignity, Rights, and Self-Control, 99 ETHICS 520 (1989); Michael J. Meyer, Kant’s
Concept of Dignity and Modern Political Thought, 8 HIST. EUR. IDEAS 319 (1987); Michael
S. Pritchard, Human Dignity and Justice, 82 ETHICS 299 (1972); Herbert Spiegelberg,
Human Dignity: A Challenge to Contemporary Philosophy, 9 PHIL. F. 39 (1971); Gloria
Zúñiga, An Ontology of Dignity, 5 METAPHYSICA 115 (2004).
Theologians have explored the concept of dignity in great depth as well. See generally CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶¶ 1700-15 (1994); Y. Michael Barilan, From
Imago Dei in the Jewish-Christian Traditions to Human Dignity in Contemporary Jewish Law,
19 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 231 (2009); Doron Shultziner, A Jewish Conception of Human
Dignity: Philosophy and Its Ethical Implications for Israeli Supreme Court Decisions, 34 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 663 (2006); Thomas F. Torrance, The Goodness and Dignity of Man in the
Christian Tradition, 4 MOD. THEOLOGY 309 (1988).
34
See, e.g., Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of
Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 655, 664-67 (2008) (examining the use of dignity in
national constitutions, international texts, and the charter of the United Nations); Oscar Schachter, Human Dignity as a Normative Concept, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 848, 848-49
(1983) (identifying where international agreements contain the term dignity); James
Q. Whitman, “Human Dignity” in Europe and the United States: The Social Foundations, 25
HUM. RTS. L.J. 17, 17-23 (2004) (comparing the U.S. conception of human dignity to
that in Europe primarily through the lens of criminal laws and attributing these varying conceptions of dignity to Europeans’ emphasis on societal equality); James Q.
Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151,
1160-61 (2004) (asserting that the difference between Europe and America’s view of
privacy is due to the varying emphasis on liberty or dignity).
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which the Court invokes dignity. The second is to explore dignity’s
judicial function in contemporary constitutional jurisprudence.
Part I of this Article critiques existing theories of dignity and proposes an alternative, Wittgensteinian approach to conceptualizing the
term. Standard accounts contend that dignity is either reducible to
another concept, such as autonomy, or has a core meaning that is applicable across all contexts. Although these views are tidy and attractive,
they tend to draw dignity’s boundaries too narrowly or too broadly.
This Article argues against a positivistic claim to dignity’s core
meaning and instead contends that dignity has multiple meanings that,
35
in Wittgenstein’s words, share “family resemblances” to each other.
While some dignitary harms can be completely described by one type
of dignity, others admit of complementary meanings. Because this heterodox approach to conceptualizing dignity begins by exploring the
use of dignity in practice, rather than in the abstract, it maintains a degree of coherence absent from the standard approaches.
Part II offers a typology of dignity that explores the compendium
of pluralistic values that the Court embraces when it speaks of dignity.
It provides the results of the first study to examine the use of dignity
in every Supreme Court case from the last 220 years in which the
36
word appears in an opinion. This research reveals that while a single concept of dignity with fixed boundaries does not exist, five different conceptions of dignity emerge that, although distinct, admit
of some similarities.
Part II proceeds to set forth these conceptions of dignity, which I
refer to as institutional status as dignity, equality as dignity, liberty as dignity,
personal integrity as dignity, and collective virtue as dignity. I first trace each
conception to its epistemic origins in philosophy, theology, or political
theory, and articulate its central features. Then, relying on the Court’s
opinions, I illustrate that each conception of dignity has a particular
judicial function oriented toward safeguarding substantive interests
against dignitary harm. Teasing out dignity’s different threads permits us to see the work that each conception of dignity is performing
for the Court. It also demonstrates why viewing dignity as only a “liberal” or “egalitarian” value is cramped and stultifying. In contrast, the
typology I propose provides the tools to evaluate what is normatively

35

LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS ¶ 66 (G.E.M. Anscombe
trans., 3d ed. 1968).
36
The dataset for this project includes signed and per curiam opinions.
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37

and doctrinally at stake in a variety of contexts and equips us with a
framework for future discussions.
I. A NOTE ON METHODOLOGY
This project will raise eyebrows among “dignity skeptics,” those
who fear the term is useless, and “antidignitarians,” who are certain
38
that it is. They are understandably wary of more “dignity talk.” But
even if they recoiled as former President George W. Bush vaguely referred to “the non-negotiable demands of human dignity,” in his
39
second State of the Union Address, or as former President Bill Clinton repeatedly emphasized the universal value of human dignity in his
40
weekly radio addresses, they cannot claim that the Supreme Court’s
reliance on dignity is inconsequential.
In the last 220 years, Supreme Court Justices have invoked the
41
term in more than nine hundred opinions. The Justices issued near42
ly half of these opinions after 1946, when the phrase “human digni43
ty” first appeared in an opinion, with more than one hundred opi37

For example, as discussed in subsection II.A.2, the Court’s increasing use of institutional status as dignity connects with the expansion of state sovereign immunity
doctrine. For a further example, see infra subsection II.E.2, which argues that the
Court’s recent emphasis in its abortion jurisprudence on collective virtue as dignity—
in lieu of liberty as dignity—signals its growing willingness to take a more normative,
and less doctrinal, approach to abortion regulation.
38
Cf. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE 171-83 (1991) (asserting that the tendency in political debates to frame
issues in terms of rights diverts political and legal discourse away from meaningful dialogue about responsibility and community).
39
Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 1
PUB. PAPERS 135 ( Jan. 29, 2002).
40
See, e.g., The President’s Radio Address, 1 PUB. PAPERS 971 (May 21, 1994) (describing Social Security as a mechanism for allowing older Americans to “face retirement in old age with dignity”); The President’s Radio Address, 1 PUB. PAPERS 569
(Apr. 2, 1994) (remembering Martin Luther King, Jr. for giving every American the
“right to live and work in dignity”); The President’s Radio Address, 1 PUB. PAPERS 556
(Mar. 26, 1994) (“[H]ealth care reform is about . . . bestowing dignity . . . .”); The President’s Radio Address, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2205 (Dec. 25, 1993) (“When we restore dignity
and security of work for all people, we’ll go a long way toward restoring the fabric of
life in all our communities.”); The President’s Radio Address, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1348
(Aug. 7, 1993) (“We want to end welfare . . . [to] restore dignity to millions . . . .”).
41
At the time of writing, a Westlaw search for “dignity” returned 926 Supreme
Court cases in which at least one opinion invoked dignity.
42
At the time of writing, a Westlaw search for “dignity” returned 425 Supreme
Court cases after 1946 in which at least one opinion invoked dignity.
43
See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 29 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“If we are ever
to develop an orderly international community based upon a recognition of human dig-
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44

nions authored in the last twenty years alone. As Figure 1 illustrates,
the percentage of Supreme Court cases that invoke dignity per Term is
increasing at a statistically significant rate (two-tailed p-value = 0.001),
and the Roberts Court appears prepared not only to continue, but al45
so to accelerate, this trend.
Figure 1: Percentage of Supreme Court Opinions That Invoke
46
Dignity per Court Term
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Notably, while the use of dignity in dissenting opinions has remained relatively stable during the last sixty-five years (Figure 2), the
Court’s reliance on dignity in majority opinions is increasing at a statistically significant rate (two-tailed p-value = 0.004) (Figure 3).

nity it is of the utmost importance that the necessary punishment of those guilty of atrocities be as free as possible from the ugly stigma of revenge and vindictiveness.”).
44
At the time of writing, a Westlaw search for “dignity” returned 109 Supreme Court
cases after 1991 in which at least one opinion invoked dignity.
45
Since Chief Justice Roberts took office in 2005, the Court has issued thirty-four
opinions that invoke dignity, nearly half of them during the last two Terms alone. See
infra Appendix Table 2.
46
There is a statistically significant, positive relationship between Court Term and
the percentage of opinions that use dignity (r = 0.40, p = 0.001). In other words, Court
Term explains approximately sixteen percent of the variance in the percentage of opinions that use dignity, and an approximately one-in-one-thousand chance exists that
these results would have been obtained if no relationship between Court Term and use
of dignity existed. Figure 1 includes majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions.
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Figure 2: Percentage of Dissenting Opinions That Invoke
47
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Figure 3: Percentage of Majority Opinions That Invoke
48
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In contrast to Figures 1 and 3, there is not a statistically significant increase in
the appearance of dignity in the Court’s dissenting opinions (r = 0.10, p = 0.42). The
use of dignity in the Court’s dissenting opinions has remained fairly flat during the
time measured. The results controlled for the number of cases in which the Court issued an opinion per Term.
48
There is a statistically significant, positive relationship between Court Term and
the percentage of majority opinions that use dignity (r = 0.35, p = 0.004). In other
words, Court Term explains approximately twelve percent of the variance in the percentage of majority opinions that use dignity, and there is less than a four-in-onethousand chance that these results would have been obtained if no relationship between Court Term and use of dignity existed. The results controlled for the number
of cases in which the Court issued an opinion per term.
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Although the Court’s frequent invocation of a word does not always signal increasing jurisprudential reliance on the underlying term,
I argue that in this instance, the correlation holds. The Court’s repeated appeals to dignity, particularly in majority opinions, appear to
parallel its greater willingness to proffer dignity as a substantive value
animating our constitutional rights. The Court has declared, for example, that the “overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to
protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by
49
the State”; that dignity is “the constitutional foundation underlying”
50
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination; that the
“basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment . . . is nothing less
51
than the dignity of man’”; and that “choices central to personal dignity and autonomy . . . are central to the liberty protected by the Four52
teenth Amendment.”
To be sure, dignity skeptics and antidignitarians can claim the
word is overused and underspecified, but it is a serious mistake to ignore altogether the Court’s increasing reliance on the term, because
the Justices’ invocation of dignity can signal a doctrinally transforma53
The question, then, is how do we understand the
tive moment.
Court’s use of dignity? And to the extent that its view of dignity is intertwined with constitutional rights, what exactly is the Court protecting when it recognizes the value of dignity?
A. Reductionism and Essentialism: Deficiencies of the Standard Approach
There have been few attempts to conceptualize dignity, and even
54
fewer efforts to do so in the context of American law. The theorists
who have undertaken this task tend to take approaches I describe as
either reductionist or essentialist.
The reductionists contend that dignity’s features are so well
aligned with some other concept that dignity is in fact reducible to
49

Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985) (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 767 (1966)).
50
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
51
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
100 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
52
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (quoting Planned Parenthood of
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (plurality opinion)).
53
For example, see infra subsections II.A.2 and II.E.2, which illustrate dignity’s
role in the evolution of the Court’s sovereign immunity doctrine and abortion jurisprudence, respectively.
54
See supra note 32.
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that concept. For example, philosopher Ruth Macklin famously
claimed that “dignity seems to mean nothing other than respect for
55
autonomy.” Since autonomy is already a respected societal value,
Macklin argues that dignity, as used in medical ethics, “can be elimi56
Likewise, psychologist Steven
nated without any loss of content.”
Pinker has stated that “[w]hen the concept of dignity is precisely specified, . . . ultimately it’s just another application of the principle of
autonomy” because “it amounts to treating people in the way that they
57
wish to be treated.”
Essentialists, by contrast, begin by asking which features of dignity
differentiate it from other concepts. They aim to distill dignity’s
meaning down to its fundamental core by searching for the root or
basic meaning of dignity. In this vein, philosopher William Parent has
argued that the essential value of dignity is “a negative moral right not
58
to be regarded or treated with unjust personal disparagement.” Similarly, international law scholar Christopher McCrudden has proposed a “minimum core” of dignity, which recognizes that “every human being possesses an intrinsic worth[,] . . . that this intrinsic worth
should be recognized and respected by others, and [that] some forms
of treatment by others are inconsistent with, or required by, respect
59
for this intrinsic worth.”
Though initially appealing for their apparent logic and coherency, the reductionist and essentialist approaches are problematic. First,
they are unable to capture and explain the inconsistencies and
nuances that pervade our thinking and speaking about dignity. Consider, for example, the following nonlegal ways in which we employ
the term.

55
56
57
58
59

Macklin, supra note 28, at 1419.
Id. at 1420.
Steven Pinker, The Stupidity of Dignity, NEW REPUBLIC, May 28, 2008, at 28, 31.
Parent, supra note 15, at 62.
McCrudden, supra note 34, at 679.
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Table 1: Nonlegal Uses of the Term “Dignity”
60

A

Dignity is inherent in every person.

A'

Some people are more dignified than others.

B

Dignity is an inviolable trait that can be affronted,
62
but not diminished or destroyed.

B'

Some acts can diminish or destroy dignity.

C

Dignity is a human trait.

C'

Dignity is possessed by non-human entities.

D

Dignity is a matter of self-respect.

D'

Dignity is dependent on respect by others.

61

63

64
65

66
67

A reductionist view of dignity cannot account for the nuanced applications of the term. If dignity is reduced to autonomy, as Macklin
contends, then the claim that dignity is inherent in all humans (claim
A) falls flat because some people, such as infants and mentally dis68
abled individuals, do not have rational capacities. Nor does the re60

See, e.g., Sulmasy, supra note 30, at 473 (“Intrinsic dignity is the value that human
beings have simply by virtue of the fact that they are human beings.”).
61
See, e.g., Holmes Rolston III, Human Uniqueness and Human Dignity: Persons in
Nature and the Nature of Persons (noting that dignity is a “relative concept” in that
“[s]ome behaviors are more dignified than others”), in HUMAN DIGNITY AND BIOETHICS, supra note 30, at 129, 147.
62
See, e.g., Peter Augustine Lawler, Modern and American Dignity (positing that dignity “depends upon natural gifts, gifts that we can misuse or distort but not destroy”),
in HUMAN DIGNITY AND BIOETHICS, supra note 30, at 229, 250.
63
See, e.g., Richard E. Ashcroft, Making Sense of Dignity, 31 J. MED. ETHICS 679, 679
(2005) (explaining that torture is often designed to destroy a torture victim’s dignity).
64
See, e.g., Rolston, supra note 61, at 147 (stating that “[a]ll humans have [dignity]”).
65
Cf. Sara Elizabeth Gavrell Ortiz, Beyond Welfare: Animal Integrity, Animal Dignity,
and Genetic Engineering, 9 ETHICS & ENV’T 94, 96 (2004) (acknowledging the argument
that genetically reducing the capacities of animals infringes upon their dignity).
66
See, e.g., Martha Nussbaum, Human Dignity and Political Entitlements (arguing that
“[h]aving the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation” are “necessary conditions of a life worthy of human dignity”), in HUMAN DIGNITY AND BIOETHICS, supra
note 30, at 351, 351, 378.
67
See, e.g., Sulmasy, supra note 30, at 473 (noting that dignity can be conferred
upon others by placing worth on particular characteristics or attributes).
68
Similarly, the reductionist view of dignity does not account for why we ascribe dignity to non-human entities, such as redwood trees, that clearly lack rationality (claim C').
See Nick Bostrom, Dignity and Enhancement (contending that dignity “is not necessarily
confined to human beings” and sharing a quote from the author John Steinbeck which
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ductionist approach cohere with our general view that others can diminish or destroy a person’s dignity by disrespecting, demeaning, or
degrading them (claim B'), even if the person does not have the ability to exercise autonomy. On the flip side, equating dignity with autonomy does not address situations where individuals make choices
that demonstrate so little self-respect that we view their conduct as
undignified (claim D). Although the reductionist approach correctly
recognizes that dignity overlaps with particular concepts like autonomy, it ignores other aspects of the human experience that a richer
conception of dignity would take into account.
Insofar as essentialist approaches define dignity by its most basic
and consistent elements, they too fail to explain its more complicated
and opposing features. For example, theories of dignity rooted in the
intrinsic value of every person (claim A) do not shed light on why society considers some people more dignified than others (claim A').
Nor do these concepts of dignity explain whether disrespectful acts
are dignity destroying and diminishing (claim B'), or merely dignity
offending (claim B).
Second, reductionist and essentialist approaches tend to draw
dignity’s boundaries either too narrowly or too broadly. Consider the
following activities and ideas that the Supreme Court has found to be
antithetical to, or incompatible with, dignity:
1.
2.
3.
4.

69

Subjecting states or state actors to lawsuits by private parties;
70
Voting laws that discriminate on the basis of race;
71
Content-based restrictions on free speech;
Regulations that interfere with a woman’s decision to end her
72
pregnancy;

captures dignity as an attribute of redwood trees), in HUMAN DIGNITY AND BIOETHICS,
supra note 30, at 173, 198.
69
See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002) (“The
preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord States the dignity that is
consistent with their status as sovereign entities.”); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715
(1999) (“The generation that designed and adopted our federal system considered
immunity from private suits central to sovereign dignity.”).
70
See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000) (“One of the principal reasons
race is treated as a forbidden classification is because it demeans the dignity and worth
of a person to be judged by ancestry . . . .”).
71
See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 116 (1991) (noting that the First Amendment’s approach to protecting
speech comports “‘with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our
political system rests’” (quoting Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448-49 (1991))).
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5. Permitting a mentally incapacitated defendant to represent
73
himself at trial;
6. Forcefully pumping a person’s stomach to collect evidence of
74
illegal drug possession;
75
7. Executing juveniles or people who are mentally incapacitated;
76
8. Partial-birth abortion.
A reductionist view is too narrow to fully account for the Court’s
decisions. For example, if dignity is simply a placeholder for autonomy,
then we can explain the Court’s use of dignity in cases 3 and 4, and
partly account for its decision in case 6; however, in the remaining cases, autonomy does not animate the Court’s decision or its use of dignity.
Some essentialist approaches also draw the concept of dignity too
narrowly. Even if we generously apply Parent’s view—that people have
a “right not to be regarded or treated with unjust personal disparage77
ment” —it does not cover case 1 (which involves the dignity of a nonhuman entity), case 3 (which involves the protection of a positive rather
than a negative right), or case 5 (which involves an individual potentially disparaging himself). Like Macklin’s concept of dignity, Parent’s view
of dignity applies only to certain persons or particular problems. Consequently, some people are prevented from vindicating their dignitary
claims, while others face uncertain or uneven redress.
78
McCrudden’s “minimum core” suffers from the opposite ailment. The concept could conceivably encompass all of the cases
72

See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (describing
family-planning and child-rearing decisions as “central to personal dignity and autonomy” and thus protected under the Fourteenth Amendment).
73
See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) (noting that if a defendant
“who lacks the mental capacity to conduct his defense without the assistance of counsel” is allowed to represent himself, the resulting “spectacle . . . is at least as likely to
prove humiliating as ennobling” and will not “‘affirm the dignity’” of such a defendant
(quoting McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176-77 (1984))).
74
See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952) (characterizing the forced
pumping of a person’s stomach as “brutal and . . . offensive to human dignity”).
75
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560, 578 (2005) (declaring that the execution
of juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment, which “reaffirms the duty of the government
to respect the dignity of all persons”); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 401, 406 (1986)
(holding that the execution of mentally incapacitated individuals is unconstitutional due
to the Eighth Amendment’s protection of “fundamental human dignity”).
76
See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007) (upholding the Federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act and describing the statute as “express[ing] respect for the
dignity of human life”).
77
Parent, supra note 15, at 62.
78
McCrudden, supra note 34, at 679-80.
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listed above (with the exception of case 1). While his work addresses
the use of dignity in the context of international human rights and
not American judicial opinions, the notion that dignity is about humans treating each other in a manner consistent with their intrinsic
worth could be viewed as protean in any setting. Without further explication of what types of treatment violate intrinsic human worth, this
essentialist conception of dignity does not give sufficient guidance to
address the complexities of actual cases.
Standard approaches to conceptualizing dignity may be the very
reason that dignity skeptics and antidignitarians have long opposed
the word. Although reductionist and essentialist conceptions highlight some aspects of dignity, by suggesting either that dignity is a
placeholder for other concepts or a discrete and universal value across
all contexts, these approaches promise too much and deliver too little.
B. Reconceptualizing Dignity: A Wittgensteinian Approach
Typical approaches to conceptualizing dignity “fall[] short” in
79
large part because they are overly bounded. They draw clear lines
around dignity to demonstrate either that it is the same as another
80
concept (e.g., autonomy) or that it is distinct from all other con81
cepts. In imposing such boundaries, dignity becomes either too exclusive or too inclusive. The result is that the law either ignores relevant dignitary problems or lacks the specific tools to recognize and
resolve such problems. At the very least, the law cannot distinguish
dignitary concerns from others that touch our humanity.
In contrast to these approaches, I propose a new method of conceptualizing dignity that draws on philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein’s
view that sharp definitions of words in natural languages often distort
82
their meaning. Wittgenstein rejected the view that a word has an essential, core meaning that applies to all uses of the word. Instead, he
83
claimed that “the meaning of a word is its use in the language,” not
an abstract link between the word and what it signifies. To determine
79

HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 300 (John Weinsheimer & Donald
G. Marshall trans., Continuum 2d rev. ed. 2004) (1960).
80
See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
81
See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
82
Wittgenstein’s linguistic theory differentiates natural languages, like English,
from purely referential languages, like geometry. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 35, ¶ 91.
In geometry, words can have fixed, core meanings. A “circle,” for example, is a set of
co-planar points equidistant from a single point.
83
Id. ¶ 43.
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a word’s meaning and function, Wittgenstein famously wrote,
84
“[D]on’t think but look!”
Wittgenstein’s insight occasionally appears in Supreme Court
opinions. For example, in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, Justice Frankfurter adopts something like it to reject an essentialist analysis of the substance/procedure distinction:
Matters of “substance” and matters of “procedure” are much talked about
in the books as though they defined a great divide cutting across the
whole domain of law. But, of course, “substance” and “procedure” are
the same keywords to very different problems. Neither . . . represents the
same invariants. Each implies different variables depending upon the
particular problem for which it is used. And the different problems are
85
only distantly related at best . . . .

By and large, however, lawyers tend to be semantic essentialists,
perhaps because of their early indoctrination into the concept of the
“elements” (individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions) of
a crime or tort. Rejecting semantic essentialism, though, can yield dividends even in the law.
Once we abandon the purely referential notion that the meaning
of a word is fixed and uniform, and turn to its actual use in language,
we begin to see—as Wittgenstein and Frankfurter did—that the same
word often has different meanings in different contexts. Consider the
word “game,” Wittgenstein’s primary example. There is not a single
definition that tells us what counts as a game and what does not. If you
consider “board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so
on . . . you will not see something that is common to all, but similari86
ties, relationships, and a whole series of them at that.” Wittgenstein
calls the similarities between different kinds of games a “family resem87
blance.” The absence of a single family-defining characteristic does
not prevent us from observing that family members resemble each

84

Id. ¶ 66.
326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945) (citation omitted). I am grateful to Bill Richman for
drawing my attention to Justice Frankfurter’s opinion in this case.
86
WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 35, ¶ 66. There are “many common features,” id.,
between chess and the children’s game “Go Fish”—both involve rules and include an
element of winning or losing—but there are also key differences. Chess involves skill;
“Go Fish” arguably does not. “Go Fish” is amusing; chess arguably is not. As my colleague Max Stearns rightly pointed out to me, one might also consider “game theory,”
which unlike the other examples, does not include any sense of recreation or fun. The
game of “chicken,” for instance, is anxiety provoking and deadly.
87
Id. ¶ 67.
85
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88

other. The same is true of words like “game” that operate in a multiplicity of ways but nevertheless retain a resemblance to each other.
Wittgenstein’s understanding of language importantly demonstrates that standard approaches to conceptualizing dignity, which
search only for its “necessary and sufficient” features, risk distorting or
circumscribing the word’s meaning. Rather than seeking exact definitions with clear and rigid boundaries, he implores us to conceptualize
words by exploring the “overlapping and criss-crossing” meanings they
89
have in practice. To conceptualize dignity, we therefore must observe how the word is employed in our discourse.
The Supreme Court’s published opinions are a rich resource for
this enterprise because they document how a politically and religiously diverse group of Justices has invoked dignity in a variety of circumstances over time. The conceptualization of dignity that I set forth is
the result of examining the various ways in which Supreme Court Justices have invoked dignity in their opinions, with particular attention
to the years since 1946, when the word “human dignity” first appeared
90
in an opinion. It is attentive to the contexts in which the term has
arisen and the variety of meanings the Court has ascribed to dignity.
This approach views dignity not as a concept, but as many conceptions. Dignity is not a fixed category, but rather a series of meanings that
share a Wittgensteinian family resemblance. The types of dignity I discerned from examining the Court’s opinions are as distinct as individual
family members are unique, but like siblings, they have overlapping characteristics. In contrast to the standard approach to conceptualizing
dignity, these types cannot be combined to form a Venn diagram with
an unchanging central core. The types are context sensitive, and an
overlap that appears in one situation may not appear in another.
One can imagine an objection to the proposed approach on the
grounds that its vision is too contingent to serve as a long-term tem88

Members of a family may share certain features such as eye color or build, but
the family is not defined by any single characteristic.
89
WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 35, ¶ 66.
90
See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 29 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting). The year 1946
also serves as a useful benchmark because it closely correlates with the end of World
War II, after which many foreign countries incorporated the word “dignity” into their
national constitutions, and the United Nations placed respect for human dignity at the
core of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See, e.g., GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949,
BGBL. I, art. 1(1) (Ger.) (stating that “human dignity shall be inviolable” under German law); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III), art. 1 (Dec. 10, 1948) (stating that “[a]ll humans are born free and
equal in dignity and rights”).
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plate for addressing dignity issues because it derives dignity’s meanings from experience, context, and usage. To the contrary, one advantage of the proposed approach lies in its flexibility. As law professor Daniel Solove explains in his ongoing efforts to conceptualize
privacy, the theory I put forth here
is but a snapshot of one point in an ongoing evolutionary process.
Theories are not lifeless pristine abstractions but organic and dynamic
beings. They are meant to live, breathe, and grow . . . [as well as] be
tested, doubted, criticized, amended, supported, and reinterpreted.
Theories, in short, are not meant to be the final word, but a new chapter
91
in an ongoing conversation.

A context-driven view of dignity develops with societal change; it
does not hold society to static meanings, but rather is responsive to
evolving attitudes, structures, and beliefs. Moreover, it recognizes that
understanding is, to use Hans-Georg Gadamer’s words, “a historically
92
effected event.”
Temporal, cultural, political, and technological
changes can create new dignity issues and even erase old ones. Dignity, therefore, cannot be defined in a permanent way, but must instead
remain open to revision.
Critics also may argue that dignity’s fluidity makes it incoherent;
that because it applies in multiple contexts to address a plurality of
problems, it lacks the consistency that makes unified, standard definitions of dignity so attractive. But traditional approaches to conceptualizing dignity have proven unable to address the distinct but related
93
issues that we use dignity to describe. By jettisoning universal notions of dignity in favor of particularized types, we can speak about
dignity more clearly. The proposed typology provides a more coherent framework against which to contemplate discrete legal issues precisely because it was created contextually, not abstractly.
II. FIVE CONCEPTIONS OF DIGNITY
When we move away from a vague notion of dignity and toward
the more specific contexts in which dignity issues arise, five conceptions of dignity appear in the dataset. I refer to these as institutional
91

DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, at ix (2008); see also Danielle Keats
Citron & Leslie Meltzer Henry, Visionary Pragmatism and the Value of Privacy in the Twenty-First Century, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1107, 1109-10 (2010) (reviewing id.) (embracing Solove’s pluralistic vision of privacy, rejecting the “quest for a singular essence of privacy”
as a “dead end,” and suggesting revisions to Solove’s approach).
92
GADAMER, supra note 79, at 299.
93
See supra Section I.A.
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status as dignity, equality as dignity, liberty as dignity, personal integrity as
dignity, and collective virtue as dignity. Each type has a distinct epistemic
story that elucidates its philosophical, religious, or political underpinnings. I connect the origins of each type of dignity to its modernday central features and then link each type back to Supreme Court
opinions that invoke the term.
In so doing, I suggest that dignity’s primary judicial function is to
give weight to substantive interests that are implicated in specific contexts. For instance, the Court invokes institutional status as dignity to give
heightened respect to U.S. states in sovereign immunity cases; equality as
dignity to justify its antidiscrimination jurisprudence; liberty as dignity to
protect individuals’ personal choices with regard to abortion and samesex sodomy; personal integrity as dignity to safeguard people’s reputations
and bodies from disgraceful or humiliating intrusions; and collective virtue as dignity to advance notions of a decent society in contexts as diverse as the death penalty and partial-birth abortion. As this Part demonstrates, each type of dignity is associated with a legal interest the
Court deems valuable in a plurality of contexts.
A. Institutional Status as Dignity
1. Aristocracy and the Recognition of Rank
It is not coincidental that today the cognate dignitary applies to
people who hold high-ranking positions in politics, government, and
the judiciary. The word “dignity” is derived from the Latin word digni94
tas. In ancient Rome, dignitas denoted the honor attached to elevated social status and the consequent respect owed to people of high
95
standing.
The Roman political aristocracy had dignitas, while the

94

4 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 656 (2d ed. 1989); see also OXFORD LATIN
DICTIONARY 542 (1982) (listing related meanings of dignus).
95
See Teresa Iglesias, Bedrock Truths and the Dignity of the Individual, LOGOS: J.
CATHOLIC THOUGHT & CULTURE, Winter 2001, at 114, 120-21 (2001) (“[D]ignitas
was . . . closely related to the meaning of honor. Political offices, and as a consequence
the persons holding them, like that of a senator, or the emperor, had dignitas. . . . The office or rank . . . carried with [it] the obligation to fulfil the duties proper to the
rank.”). Julius Caesar used this notion of dignitas to explain that he partly fought the
Roman Civil War to restore men to their proper rank and title. He wrote that he
aimed “to restore . . . [the] dignity [of] the tribunes,” who were the titular leaders driven out of Rome during the war. JULIUS CAESAR, THE CIVIL WAR bk. I, ¶ 22 ( J.M.
Carter ed. & trans., Aris & Phillips 1991) (c. 45 B.C.E.).
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lower-ranking plebeians did not. Similarly, men could possess digni97
tas in ancient Rome, while women could not.
When “dignity” entered the English language in 1225, it maintained
its connection to rank and hierarchy, most notably in reference to the
British monarchy. Blackstone’s Commentaries explains, for example, that
because the King is the titular head of state, “it is beneath the dignity of
the king’s courts to be merely ancillary to other inferior jurisdic98
tions . . . .” All criminal offenses in England are “either against the
king’s peace, or his crown and dignity; and are so laid in every indict99
Blackstone comments that even the “ancient jewels of the
ment.”
100
crown . . . are necessary to . . . support the dignity of the sovereign.”
From the thirteenth century until the Enlightenment, the predominant view was that dignity is an attribute reserved for high-ranking
101
Kings, bishops, and
positions and the people who occupy them.
102
noblemen possessed dignity; commoners did not.
As Thomas
Hobbes wrote in 1651, “the publique worth of a man, which is the
96

Iglesias, supra note 95, at 120-21. In ancient Rome, the term dignitas was also
applied to exemplary poets, orators, and politicians. See, e.g., 2 QUINTILIAN, INSTITUTES OF THE ORATOR 409 ( J. Patsall trans., B. Law 1774) (c. 95 C.E.) (commenting
on “the dignity of Messala,” a particularly impressive orator); Cicero, Speech in Defence of the Proposed Manilian Law (explaining that Pompeius alone has the dignity
to be put in supreme command), in ORATIONS 125, 134-50 (Charles Duke Yonge
trans., New York, Colonial Press rev. ed. 1899).
97
See CICERO, ON DUTIES bk. I, ¶ 130 (M.T. Griffin & E.M. Atkins eds., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1991) (44 B.C.E.) (“There are two types of beauty: one includes gracefulness, and the other dignity. We ought to think gracefulness a feminine quality and
dignity a masculine one.”).
98
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *98.
99
1 id. at *258.
100
2 id. at *428.
101
Dictionaries published before the Enlightenment substantiate this usage. See,
e.g., NATHAN BAILEY, DICTIONARIUM BRITANNICUM 265 (London, T. Cox 1736) (defining dignity as “office or employment in church or state”); 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Philadelphia, Moses Thomas 1818) (defining
dignity as “rank of elevation”). Dignity also was invoked on occasion as a noun to denote a public office. The 1669 Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina state, for example, that “[n]o one person shall have more than one dignity,” or public position.
FUNDAMENTAL CONSTS. OF CAROLINA of 1669, art. XIII, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE
STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOR OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 2772, 2774 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909); see also id. art. IX,
at 2773 (granting members of parliament “hereditary nobility of the province . . . by
right of their dignity . . . [as] members”).
102
See, e.g., EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 60
(Anchor Books 1973) (1790) (ascribing dignity to the nobility and denying it to the
common person); JOHNSON, supra note 101 (under “dignitary”) (describing clergymen
as possessing dignity).
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Value set on him by the Common-wealth, is that which men common103
ly call DIGNITY.” A person’s dignity, or worth, was simply a function
of social status.
This notion of dignity, which I call institutional status as dignity, has
several defining characteristics. As a starting point, it is not intrin104
sic. Since it is grounded in, and depends on, the existence of social
hierarchy, only select individuals or institutions will ever acquire it.
Nor is institutional status as dignity a permanent trait. It is held only
as long as others deem the person or institution worthy of its respect.
Consequently, this form of dignity can be gained or lost as a person is
promoted to or demoted from a given position in society.
Institutional status as dignity is, by virtue of these defining qualities, both inegalitarian and contingent. It presupposes, and indeed
requires, a power differential, which in turn creates an obligation of
vertical respect. Institutional status as dignity is therefore “centrally
105
an experience of [h]eight.”
Those who rank below people and institutions that have dignity owe them respect, a “bowing gesture” of
106
sorts. Because people deserve respect only in relation to their variable dignity or social merit, the respect that dignity garners is contin107
gent, rather than necessary. Simply stated, not all human beings or
institutions deserve respect under this framework.
2. Bestowing Respect on Government and Its Accoutrements
Historically, the law has reinforced institutional status as dignity,
taking steps where necessary to protect individuals whose dignity is as108
sociated with elevated political or social rank. The Magna Carta, for
example, exempted earls and barons from being tried by the jury sys109
tem that governed commoners, and the 1689 English Bill of Rights
103

THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 63 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1991) (1651).
104
The case of a hereditary monarchy provides what looks to be an exception
since the person is born with titular dignity; however, this dignity is not intrinsic to
their humanity, but rather to their rank.
105
Kolnai, supra note 33, at 252 (internal quotation marks omitted).
106
Id. (internal quotations marks omitted).
107
Gewirth, supra note 14, at 17. This dichotomy is commonly drawn in ethics literature as well. See, e.g., Stephen L. Darwall, Two Kinds of Respect, 88 ETHICS 36, 38-39
(1977) (suggesting that there is a difference between “appraisal respect” and “recognition respect”).
108
Waldron, Dignity, Rank, and Rights, supra note 32, at 34-35.
109
MAGNA CARTA ch. 21 (1215), reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL BILL OF RIGHTS 8, 12
(Gordon Lloyd & Margie Lloyd eds., 1998).
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granted special legal respect to the “Crown and royal dignity.”
The
early American colonies also took steps in the form of sumptuary laws
to maintain the divide between those who possessed dignity and those
111
who did not.
When George Washington addressed Congress in 1793, however,
and suggested that the dignity of the nobility be replaced by the “dig112
nity of the United States,” he set the modern-day application of in113
stitutional status as dignity in motion.
For the last two hundred
years, the Supreme Court has consistently invoked dignity to protect
and vindicate the institutional status of governments and their ac114
coutrements. Among other functions, the Court has employed dignity to describe the heightened respect owed to judges and cour115
trooms, foreign nations, and American states.
As anyone who has been to court, or even watched Law and Order
knows, courtrooms are characterized as hallowed places governed by
certain formalities, all of which emphasize the court’s authority and the
respect it commands. Court sessions generally commence when the
bailiff says, “All rise for the Honorable . . . .” The judge then enters the
room wearing judicial robes and takes his or her seat on an elevated
platform; the gallery is seated; and the parties’ first words to the court
or judge are, “May it please the court” or “Your Honor.” In this setting,

110

An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, and Settling the Succession of the Crown (Bill of Rights), 1689, 1 W. & M., c. 2 (Eng.). Also, while defamation of a commoner was considered libel or slander under early English law, defamation of a member of the British nobility was punished as scandalum magnatum, both a
crime and a tort, enforced by the King’s Council. Waldron, Dignity, Rank, and Rights,
supra note 32, at 34-35.
111
The General Laws of Massachusetts famously prohibited anyone but large
landholders from wearing gold, silver, lace, silk, boots, ruffles, capes, or other signifiers
of high social status. The General Laws of the Massachusetts Colony, Apparel, at A.51,
p.5 (1651), reprinted in THE COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS 5 (Boston, Rockwell &
Churchill City Printers 1887).
112
George Washington, Fifth Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 3, 1793), in 7
THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 36, 39 ( Jared Sparks ed., Boston, American
Stationer’s Co. 1837).
113
Washington’s application of dignity was consistent with its function in the Federalist Papers, in which every use of the word dignity is tied to the heightened standing of the government, the nation, or the offices thereof. Jeremy Rabkin, What We Can
Learn About Human Dignity from International Law, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 145, 156
(2003). The word dignity, according to Rabkin, appears seventeen times in the Federalist Papers. Id.
114
See infra notes 121-23, 135-49, and accompanying text.
115
See infra notes 117-53 and accompanying text.
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the aristocratic tradition of according dignity, and thus deference, to
116
high-ranking institutions and officers, finds modern expression.
When individuals fail to appropriately respect the dignity of the
117
proceedings, judges may respond with contempt orders. Chief Justice
Taft explained in Cooke v. United States that “[t]he power of contempt
which a judge must have and exercise in protecting the due and orderly
administration of justice[,] and in maintaining the authority and digni118
ty of the court[,] is most important and indispensable.” Throughout
116

The Supreme Court has also invoked institutional status as dignity to express
the respect owed to another symbol of democracy, the American flag. In Texas v. Johnson, the Court declined to condemn the burning of a U.S. flag, instead arguing that its
dignity was venerated best by permitting individuals to act with the freedom the flag
symbolizes. 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989). As Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, explained:
We can imagine no more appropriate response to burning a flag than waving
one’s own, no better way to counter a flag burner’s message than by saluting
the flag that burns, no surer means of preserving the dignity even of the flag
that burned than by—as one witness here did—according its remains a respectful burial. We do not consecrate the flag by punishing its desecration, for
in doing so we dilute the freedom that this cherished emblem represents.
Id. As in the judicial contempt cases, the Court’s invocation of dignity in Texas v. Johnson reinforces the typology’s claim that institutional status as dignity is contingent. The
flag, like the courtroom, derives its status from the freedom and justice it represents,
but if those values are undermined, its institutional status as dignity is threatened.
117
In most cases, contempt orders or the threat thereof give judges sufficient
power to curb improper courtroom behavior that could unfairly affect the outcome of
a case. In rare cases, in which serious misconduct takes place unchecked by the trial
judge, the Supreme Court has vacated the decision and remanded the case on grounds
that the proceedings lacked proper dignity. For a particularly egregious example, see
Wellons v. Hall, a recent federal habeas case in which the Court vacated the judgment
below and remanded because, in addition to other potentially improper ex parte exchanges between the jurors and the judge, “some jury members gave the trial judge
chocolate shaped as male genitalia and the bailiff chocolate shaped as female breasts.”
130 S. Ct. 727, 729, 732 (2010) (per curiam). Explaining that “judicial proceedings
conducted for the purpose of deciding whether a defendant shall be put to death must
be conducted with dignity and respect,” id. at 728, the Court held that the Eleventh
Circuit should “consider, on the merits, whether petitioner’s allegations, together with
the undisputed facts, warrant discovery and an evidentiary hearing.” Id. at 732. But see,
e.g., Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 81 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (agreeing
with the majority holding that buttons displaying a murder victim’s image worn by family members during the defendant’s trial were not prejudicial and did not run afoul of
the “general rule to preserve the calm and dignity of a court”).
118
267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925); see also Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 463-65
(1971) (citing Cooke approvingly in a case in which the Court contended that a state
trial judge should have found an individual who had routinely disrupted the courtroom with outbursts in contempt of court in the first instance rather than letting the
defendant’s antics destroy the “fair administration of justice”); United States v. Barnett,
376 U.S. 681, 696-97 (1964) (“‘It has always been one of the attributes—one of the
powers necessarily incident to a court of justice—that it should have this power of vin-
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the last century, the Court repeatedly has articulated its view that contempt orders are proper when offense is made “against [a judge’s] dig119
nity and authority.” Even when the judge’s dignity is not at issue, the
Court has upheld contempt orders issued to individuals who engage in
conduct considered contemptuous, discourteous, or disruptive to the
120
dignity of judicial proceedings.
The Supreme Court also has a long history of employing the language of institutional status as dignity to describe the heightened level
of respect owed to foreign nations. In the classic 1812 case, The
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, the Court considered whether an
American citizen in an American court could assert title to an armed
121
French vessel “found within the waters of the United States.” Drawing on principles of the law of nations, Chief Justice Marshall concluded that it would be incompatible with the “dignity” of the foreign
sovereign to submit to the authority of the United States because
doing so would undermine the foreign state’s own rank and authori122
ty.
Since deciding The Schooner Exchange, the Supreme Court has
consistently invoked dignity to protect the institutional status of other
123
nations in foreign sovereign immunity cases.
The most noteworthy judicial function of institutional status as
dignity has been to dramatically expand the doctrine of state sovereign
immunity. Institutional status as dignity has long played a part in state
sovereign immunity cases, as it has in foreign sovereign immunity cases. But in recent decades the Court has thrust dignity into the spotdicating its dignity, of enforcing its orders, of protecting itself from insult . . . .’” (quoting Eilenbecker v. Dist. Court, 134 U.S. 31, 36 (1890))); Sacher v. United States, 343
U.S. 1, 30 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (contending that Cooke states the proper
justification for contempt orders).
119
Sacher, 343 U.S. at 12.
120
See United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 316 n.8 (1975) (“In order to constitute
an affront to the dignity of the court the judge himself need not be personally insulted.”).
121
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 135 (1812).
122
Id. at 137-38; see also Smith, supra note 32, at 39-50 (offering a detailed discussion of dignity in the context of foreign state sovereign immunity).
123
See, e.g., First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 769
(1972) (plurality opinion) (explaining that after The Schooner Exchange the law “is one of
implied consent by the territorial sovereign to exempt the foreign sovereign from its
exclusive and absolute jurisdiction, the implication deriving from standards of public
morality, fair dealing, reciprocal self-interest, and respect for the power and dignity of
the foreign sovereign” (quoting Nat’l City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 362
(1955))); Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943) (noting that the “judicial
seizure of a vessel of a friendly foreign state is so serious a challenge to its dignity, and
may so affect our friendly relations with it, that courts are required to accept and follow
the executive determination that the vessel is immune”).
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light and relied on it as the central reason to grant states immunity
from suit. The effect has been a considerable expansion of the doc124
trine of sovereign immunity.
Significantly, the now-dominant view that it is an “indignity” to
subject “a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the in125
stance of private parties” has not always been the Court’s position.
For the first seventy years of its tenure, the Court held the opposite
perspective and recognized the superior dignity of the sovereign
people as the primary reason for allowing citizen suits.
Just five years after the Constitution was ratified, the Court in
Chisholm v. Georgia considered whether a citizen of one state could
126
bring suit against another state in the United States Supreme Court.
The plaintiff was a merchant from South Carolina who had entered
into a contract to purchase war supplies from the State of Georgia. In
a 4-1 decision, the Court decided that although a full sovereign nation
like the United States might enjoy immunity, the same accommoda127
tion was not available to Georgia.
The opinion is replete with invocations of dignity, almost all of
which refer to the dignity of the American people, not the dignity of
128
the state or nation. Expressing his view of popular sovereignty, Justice Wilson wrote that “[a] State . . . useful and valuable as the contrivance is, is the inferior contrivance of man; and from his native dignity
129
derives all of its acquired importance.”
He concluded that because
“a State . . . [is] subordinate to the people,” it is susceptible to citizen
130
In agreement, Chief Justice Jay explained that because the
suits.
people established the Constitution “with becoming dignity” and
131
“proper sovereignty” that “a State may be sued.”
In distinguishing
the American principle of popular sovereignty from the English
common law, which granted impenetrable power and jurisdiction in

124

See Smith, supra note 32, at 28-36 (commenting on the Court’s growing use of the
concept “dignity of the states” to justify a more robust doctrine of sovereign immunity).
125
In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887).
126
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 430-32 (1793).
127
Id. at 480.
128
But see id. at 452-53 (opinion of Blair, J.) (noting that it would be “incompatible
with the dignity of a State” to issue a default judgment against Georgia for its refusal to
appear in this case).
129
Id. at 455 (opinion of Wilson, J.) (emphasis omitted).
130
Id. (emphasis omitted).
131
Id. at 471-73 (opinion of Jay, C.J.).
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132

the office of the King, the Court in Chisholm firmly rejected the view
that states have institutional status as dignity.
States responded to Chisholm with “outrage,” and within a day of
the Court’s decision, Congress considered the proposal that led to the
133
The Court has subsequently
Eleventh Amendment’s adoption.
demonstrated both in its commentary and through its holdings that
the decision in Chisholm deviated from the Founders’ view that “im134
munity from private suits [is] central to sovereign dignity.”
In the past fifteen years, the Court has referred to institutional status as dignity as the “‘central,’ ‘preeminent,’ and ‘primary’ justification”
135
for expanding states’ immunity from suit. In Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
136
Florida, the Court overruled its earlier holding in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., which had acknowledged congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause to abrogate states’ Eleventh Amendment sovereign
137
immunity. Explaining that the Eleventh Amendment “serves to avoid
‘the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tri138
bunals at the instance of private parties,’” the Court in Seminole Tribe
held that Congress lacks power under Article I to abrogate states’ sove139
reign immunity from suit in federal courts.
132

The opinions of Justices Iredell, Wilson, and Jay go to particular lengths to contrast the American and English views of sovereign immunity. See id. at 443-44, 448
(opinion of Iredell, J.) (placing the King’s role in determining whether to continue
proceedings against his sovereign body in contradistinction to that of a state, which
“derives its authority from . . . [t]he voluntary and deliberate choice of the people”
(emphasis omitted)); id. at 458 (opinion of Wilson, J.) (echoing Justice Iredell in explaining that the King obtained sovereignty over everything, but that nothing, in turn,
had sovereignty over him, while in the United States “the sovereign . . . must be found
in the man” (emphasis omitted)); id. at 471-72 (opinion of Jay, C.J.) (distinguishing
between European sovereignties, which were premised on “feudal principles,” and
American sovereignty, which “devolved on the people” (emphasis omitted)).
133
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 720-21 (1999); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XI
(“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”).
134
Alden, 527 U.S. at 715. See generally id. at 715-27 (explaining why the Eleventh
Amendment better reflects the Framers’ intentions with regard to state sovereignty
than does the decision in Chisholm).
135
Smith, supra note 32, at 5 (quoting Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth.,
535 U.S. 743, 760, 765, 769 (2002)).
136
517 U.S. 44 (1996).
137
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 23 (1989) (plurality opinion), overruled by Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44.
138
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 58 (quoting P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf
& Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993)).
139
Id. at 72-73.
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In Alden v. Maine, the Court expanded its jurisprudence to hold
that Article I legislation cannot abrogate states’ immunity from suit in
140
state courts. Again invoking the language of dignity to justify its decision, the Court noted that “[t]he generation that designed and
adopted our federal system considered immunity from private suits
141
central to sovereign dignity.” Compelling a state to appear in its own
142
courts is “offensive” to its stature and “denigrates” its sovereignty.
The Court’s subsequent decision in Federal Maritime Commission v.
South Carolina State Ports Authority is arguably its most brazen use of
dignity in this context. In concluding that state sovereign immunity
bars a federal agency from adjudicating a claim against a state, the
Court did not consider anything other than the state’s dignitary inter143
est. The Court justified its finding as follows:
[I]f the Framers thought it an impermissible affront to a State’s dignity
to be required to answer the complaints of private parties in federal
courts, we cannot imagine that they would have found it acceptable to
compel a State to do exactly the same thing before the administrative
tribunal of an agency, such as the FMC. The affront to a State’s dignity
does not lessen when an adjudication takes place in an administrative
144
tribunal as opposed to an Article III court.

The Court’s efforts to safeguard states from what seems like disrespectful behavior by citizens is further elucidated by the majority’s suggestion that
[o]ne, in fact, could argue that allowing a private party to haul a State in
front of such an administrative tribunal constitutes a greater insult to a
State’s dignity than requiring a State to appear in an Article III court
presided over by a judge with life tenure nominated by the President of
145
the United States and confirmed by the United States Senate.

Last Term, in Sossamon v. Texas, the Court reaffirmed its reasoning
from Seminole Tribe, Alden, and Federal Maritime Commission to again
140

527 U.S. 706, 732-33 (1999).
Id. at 715.
142
Id. at 749.
143
Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760-61 (2002).
144
Id. at 760 (citations omitted).
145
Id. at 760 n.11; cf. Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632,
1640 (2011) (dismissing as flawed the argument that the state’s dignity would be diminished if a federal court adjudicated disputes between state components). In Stewart,
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, distinguished the case from Federal Maritime Commission by explaining that “[d]enial of sovereign immunity . . . offends the dignity of a
State; but not every offense to the dignity of a State constitutes a denial of sovereign
immunity.” Id. at 1640.
141
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146

preclude a lawsuit against a state.
At issue in Sossamon was whether
Texas, by accepting federal funds, consented to waive its sovereign
immunity to suits for money damages under the Religious Land Use
147
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000.
Holding that it did not,
the Court viewed the question as long settled. Dating back to “the time
148
the Constitution was drafted,” the Court explained, state sovereign
149
immunity doctrine has been “central to sovereign dignity.”
For many scholars, the reemergence of institutional status as dignity to describe states “as if they were natural persons that could expe150
rience hurt feelings beyond those of their residents” is enough to
151
“strain[] credulity.”
The Court’s dissenting Justices would not disagree. In rejecting the holdings in Seminole Tribe and Alden, Justice
Stevens and Justice Souter, respectively, called the Court’s reliance on
152
dignity “embarrassingly insufficient,” and noted that “[w]hatever
justification there may be for an American government’s immunity
153
from private suit, it is not dignity.” Just how far the Court will go in
expanding its state sovereign immunity jurisprudence remains to be
seen, but its increasing reliance on institutional status as dignity to do
so will be controversial.
B. Equality as Dignity
1. Egalitarianism and Universal Human Worth
As a theoretical and practical matter, institutional status as dignity
met its earliest and harshest critics during the Enlightenment. Prorevolutionary activists sought to supplant aristocracy with democracy,
and a new, more egalitarian dignity surfaced. Edmund Burke’s view
that man’s dignity was simply a function of his place in the social hie-

146

131 S. Ct. 1651, 1655 (2011).
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to cc-5 (2006).
148
Sossamon, 131 S. Ct. at 1657.
149
Id. (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
150
Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court, 1997 Term—Foreword: The Limits of Socratic
Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 61 (1998).
151
Henry Paul Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity “Exception,” 110 HARV. L. REV.
102, 132 (1996).
152
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 97 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 151
(1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
153
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 802-03 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting).
147
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154

rarchy was forcefully countered by Thomas Paine’s call for the rec155
ognition of “the natural dignity of man.”
In America, this shift coincided with the ratification of the Consti156
Thomas Jefferson held the
tution, which banned titles of nobility.
view that “the dignity of man is lost in arbitrary distinctions” based on
157
“birth or badge,” and Alexander Hamilton agreed, arguing that a
constitutional democracy was the “safest course for your liberty, your
158
dignity, and your happiness.” Change was afoot, and the rallying cry
159
was one that recognized the equal worth of all human beings.
Just what characteristics imbued all human beings with dignity was
less often articulated, but two explanations based on theology and philosophy can be confidently posited. The Judeo-Christian traditions believe that the dignity of human beings is derived from their creation in
160
the image of God. While the theological claim has been interpreted
154

See BURKE, supra note 102, at 60.
THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN 41 (Gregory Claeys ed., Hackett Publ’g Co.,
1992) (1791–1792).
156
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (“No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States . . . .”); id. art I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . grant any Title of Nobility.”).
157
Thomas Jefferson, Observations on Démeunier’s Manuscript ( June 22, 1786),
reprinted in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 575, 587 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984).
158
THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 14 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898).
Notably, Hamilton was an illegitimate child and may have had a personal stake in
avoiding titles linked to hereditary status. See RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON
226-27 (2004) (explaining that Hamilton’s illegitimacy may have influenced his views
on certain political issues, such as a bill that would have in essence forced unwed
mothers to disclose having an illegitimate child).
159
However, it should be noted that most calls for equal dignity in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries were not concerned with dignity for all people, but rather
with dignity for all white men. As Thurgood Marshall noted,
155

For a sense of the evolving nature of the Constitution we need look no further
than the first three words of the document’s preamble: “We the People.”
When the Founding Fathers used this phrase in 1787, they did not have in
mind the majority of America’s citizens. “We the People” included, in the
words of the framers, “the whole Number of free Persons.” On a matter so basic as the right to vote, for example, Negro slaves were excluded, although
they were counted for representational purposes—at three-fifths each. Women did not gain the right to vote for over a hundred and thirty years.
Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1987) (footnote omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3); cf.
MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT, A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMAN ch. IV (Charles W.
Hagelman, Jr. ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1967) (1792) (arguing in the eighteenth century that women were not simply “a part of man,” but “whole” and rational individuals
worthy of equal respect).
160
See Barilan, supra note 33, at 233 (noting the theological view that “all humans
are equal in terms of their imago Dei,” and thus, dignity).
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in different ways, the central premise is that humans have a unique
161
worth derived from God’s excellence.
Since all people are made in
God’s image, “there is no Greek or Jew, circumcised or uncircumcised,
162
barbarian, Scythian, slave or free.” The community under God is not
divided by differences, but united by its creation in God’s image. Those
who deny God’s existence, or who otherwise reject the creation story,
will not find this view of dignity’s origins plausible and may opt to
anchor human dignity in a philosophical theory.
Philosophical approaches to universal human dignity argue that
all humans have dignity because they possess a common trait worthy
of recognition. The metaphysical conundrum that divides philosophers is determining which human characteristic denotes equal human dignity. Philosophers have attempted to ground dignity in what
some see as humans’ unique ability to reason, experience pain, form
culture, teach collaboratively, have meaningful life projects, and en163
gage in self-reflection.
The challenge posed by pinning dignity to
any of these qualities, however, is that some humans may not be able
to express the dignity-denoting trait. People with severe mental disabilities, for example, may not have the capacity to express most of
these characteristics, yet we would surely include them in a vision of
164
dignity based on universal human worth.
One response to this problem is to claim that, despite inter- and
intra-human variability, all humans have dignity because, as a class,
165
humans have the capacity to express the relevant characteristic. An
161

See Kass, supra note 30, at 323-24 (explaining that “[h]uman life is to be respected more than animal life . . . because man is more than an animal; man is said to
be god-like”).
162
Colossians 3:11 (New International).
163
For a discussion of which distinctively human characteristics might be considered dignity denoting, see Rolston, supra note 61, at 129-50. Rolston also discusses
the possibility, strengthened by advances in evolutionary biology, that some primates
may have characteristics traditionally understood as human characteristics. Id. at 131.
164
If we place those humans who do not have the particular quality that defines
one as a dignity-bearer outside of the moral community, the result would be an inegalitarian view of human dignity that is inconsistent with equality as dignity.
165
Importantly, the theological and philosophical approaches share an evolutionary outlook. They understand humans as the highest life form, either as God’s chosen creatures or as creatures with characteristics superior to plants and other animals.
Notably, this form of dignity as equality is for humans only; by its very definition, it
renders non-humans inferior. For this reason, well-known philosopher and animal
rights activist Peter Singer has claimed that the idea of according special dignity to
humans is “speciesist” because it discriminates on the basis of whether a being belongs
to a certain species. PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION: A NEW ETHICS FOR OUR
TREATMENT OF ANIMALS 7-10 (1975). For a different, but related perspective, see Wal-
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alternative response is to argue that “the trait by virtue of which humans deserve moral respect is the trait of being human, nothing more
166
and nothing less.” In this view, all people equally possess dignity be167
cause they are representatives of humanity.
Though they differ in significant ways, both the theological and philosophical explanations contribute to a better understanding of what I
168
term equality as dignity. This type of dignity is defined by three central
elements. First, dignity is universal. It is an intrinsic quality of all human beings, bestowed upon individuals not by social rank, but simply by
nature of being human. Human existence, whether derived from
God’s image or as an icon of humanity, confers dignity. Second, dignity
is permanent. Unlike institutional status as dignity, equality as dignity
does not wax and wane, but instead remains constant. Third, as a consequence of these two features, dignity functions as a horizontal and relational value. Guided by the idea of reciprocity, all humans owe redron, Dignity, Rank, and Rights, supra note 32, at 26-29, which hypothesizes that our society has evolved by transferring the dignity and respect once accorded only to nobility
downwards to every human being.
166
Avishai Margalit, Human Dignity Between Kitsch and Deification, HEDGEHOG REV.,
Fall 2007, at 7, 17.
167
The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights seemingly articulates this perspective. Historical accounts of the Declaration’s drafting suggest that
while the relevant delegates all agreed that equal human dignity was important, they
disagreed as to what substantively made such equality paramount. See MARY ANN
GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 226 (2001) (observing that “there was remarkably little disagreement regarding [the Declaration’s] substance, despite intense wrangling over
some specifics”). Their agreement—that all humans possess dignity, without further
philosophical or theological explanation—exemplifies what Cass Sunstein calls an “incompletely theorized agreement.” Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements,
108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1735-36 (1995); see also Paul Weithman, Two Arguments from
Human Dignity (positing that “the fact that the notion of human dignity is at home in a
number of moral traditions makes it an especially useful ‘second-level concept,’” in
that it serves to express “moral agreement among those who may differ about what
first-order ethical vocabulary best explains why human beings merit respect”), in HUMAN DIGNITY AND BIOETHICS, supra note 30, at 435, 437.
168
The German word menschenwürde comes closest to referring to the kind of dignity that all humans inherently possess because they are human. See generally Dieter
Birnbacher, Ambiguities in the Concept of Menschenwürde (“To respect Menschenwürde
means to respect certain minimal rights owned by its bearer irrespective of considerations of achievement, merit and quality and owned even by those who themselves do
not respect these minimal rights in others.”), in SANCTITY OF LIFE AND HUMAN DIGNITY
110, 110 (Kurt Bayertz ed., 1996); Damian P. Fedoryka, The Ontological and Existential
Dimensions of Human Dignity (characterizing ontological dignity as “dynamic,” rather
than “static,” and claiming that this dignity can only be “actualized” by “a free, conscious and personal act”), in MENSCHENWÜRDE: METAPHYSIK UND ETHIK 119, 141 (Mariano Crespo ed., 1998).
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spect to, and deserve respect from, each other as beings of equal worth.
Whether young or old, sinner or saint, mentally high-performing or
mentally disabled, each person deserves the same basic respect.
2. Shielding People from Unequal Treatment
In the 1940s, the Supreme Court’s use of dignity began to shift
from its nearly exclusive focus on institutional status as dignity to a
169
broader vision that included personal and collective types of dignity.
The Civil Rights Era further cemented this change by focusing the
Court’s attention on equality as dignity in antidiscrimination cases.
Today, the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence continues to rely
170
on equality as dignity to give substance to its egalitarian mandate.
The first Civil Rights Era case in which the Court employed equal171
ity as dignity was Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States. The case
involved a motel operator who violated Title II of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 by refusing service to African Americans on the basis of their
172
race.
In rejecting the motel operator’s constitutional challenge to
the Act’s public accommodations provision, the Court noted that the
purpose of the Act was to “vindicate the deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public establish-

169

This change coincided with the end of World War II, which prompted several
nations that had committed wartime atrocities to incorporate respect for human dignity into their constitutions. See, e.g., GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], art. 1(1) (stating that “human dignity
shall be inviolable” under German law). It also overlapped chronologically with the
adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which gave a central place to
the equal dignity of human beings. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.
Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III), art. 1 (Dec. 10, 1948) (stating that “[a]ll
humans are born free and equal in dignity and rights”). Although one can only speculate that these events prompted the Court to pay greater attention to individual and
collective dignity, its shift in that direction is unmistakable. For a more detailed discussion of the incorporation of dignity into foreign constitutions and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, see McCrudden, supra note 34, at 664-67.
170
Cf. Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 776-81
(2011) (exploring the evolving role of “liberty-based dignity” in equal protection law).
In rare instances, the Court has also invoked equality as dignity outside of the equal
protection doctrine. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52 (1980) (modifying the traditional spousal privilege rule, which did not allow women a choice in testifying, because “[t]he ancient foundations for so sweeping a privilege have long since
disappeared. Nowhere in the common-law world—indeed in any modern society—is a
woman regarded as chattel or demeaned by denial of a separate legal identity and the
dignity associated with recognition as a whole human being.”).
171
379 U.S. 241 (1964).
172
Id. at 243-44.
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173

ments.”
In upholding Congress’s power to prohibit racial discrimination in interstate commerce, the Court accepted the view that exclusion from public accommodations on the basis of race denies indi174
viduals the equal dignity and respect they merit as human beings.
The Court repeated this language in Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
a case upholding a Minnesota statute that prohibited gender discrim175
ination in public accommodations. Writing for the majority, Justice
Brennan explained that gender discrimination similarly “deprives persons of their individual dignity,” as it is an injury that “is surely felt as
strongly by persons suffering discrimination on the basis of their sex
176
as by those treated differently because of their race.”
Following
Heart of Atlanta, the Court recognized that people suffer dignitary
harms when they are categorized in a manner that ignores their
177
shared equality as dignity with others.
More recently, the Court has extended its use of equality as dignity to prohibit jury selection based on race or gender. In Powers v.
Ohio, the Court considered whether a prosecutor’s use of peremptory
challenges to exclude otherwise qualified jurors on the basis of race
violated the Equal Protection Clause and concluded that “racial discrimination in the qualification or selection of jurors offends the dig178
nity of persons and the integrity of the courts.”
The Court warned
that by actively engaging in racial discrimination, the prosecutor’s be173

Id. at 250 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 257.
175
468 U.S. 609, 623-29 (1984).
176
Id. at 625.
177
Id. The Court reiterated the nature of this harm in Rice v. Cayetano, which involved a Hawaiian citizen who challenged a statute that barred him from voting because he was neither a “native Hawaiian[]” nor a descendant of inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands. 528 U.S. 495, 499 (2000). In holding that the statute violated the
Fifteenth Amendment because it used ancestry as a proxy for race, the Court explained that “[o]ne of the principal reasons race is treated as a forbidden classification
is that it demeans the dignity and worth of a person to be judged by ancestry instead of
by his or her own merit and essential qualities.” Id. at 517. Chief Justice Roberts further emphasized this point in the recent plurality decision in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 when he explained that racial classifications
in schools are particularly demeaning to individual dignity. 551 U.S. 701, 746-47
(2007) (plurality opinion); see also id. at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[A] statemandated racial label is inconsistent with the dignity of individuals in our society.”).
178
499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991); accord Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 44 (1992)
(“For more than a century, this Court consistently and repeatedly has reaffirmed that
racial discrimination by the State in jury selection offends the Equal Protection
Clause.”); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991) (“Recognizing the impropriety of racial bias in the courtroom, we hold that race-based exclusion
violates the equal protection rights of challenged jurors.”).
174
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havior may even cast “doubt upon the credibility or dignity of a wit179
ness” merely because of the color of his or her skin.
In articulating its use of equality as dignity, the Court rejected the
suggestion that
no particular stigma or dishonor results if a prosecutor uses the raw fact
of skin color to determine the objectivity or qualifications of a juror. We
do not believe a victim of the classification would endorse this view; the
assumption that no stigma or dishonor attaches contravenes accepted
equal protection principles. Race cannot be a proxy for determining ju180
ror bias or competence.

Similar reasoning animated the Court’s decision in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., in which the Court held that gender, like race, is an
181
Invoking the notion of
unconstitutional basis for juror selection.
equality as dignity, the Court explained that eliminating jurors solely
because of their gender “is ‘practically a brand upon them, affixed by
the law, an assertion of their inferiority.’ . . . It denigrates the dignity
of the excluded juror, and, for a woman, reinvokes a history of exclu182
sion from political participation.”
In each of these decisions, the
Court relied on equality as dignity to direct attention to the nature of
the harm that marginalized individuals or groups experience as the
183
result of differential treatment.

179

Powers, 499 U.S. at 412.
Id. at 410.
181
511 U.S. 127, 130 (1994).
182
Id. at 142 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880)).
183
The Court has invoked equality as dignity when deciding other cases. See, e.g.,
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 918 (1982) (supporting the
NAACP’s right to a peaceful boycott, even though the targeted white businesses suffered damages, in part because the boycotters were challenging “a political and economic system that had denied them the basic rights of dignity and equality that this
country had fought a Civil War to secure”). But cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104
(2000) (asserting that “[w]hen the state legislature vests the right to vote for President
in its people, the right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is fundamental; and one
source of its fundamental nature lies in the equal weight accorded to each vote and the
equal dignity owed to each voter”). In Bush v. Gore, the Court’s emphasis on dignity is
not aimed at protecting traditionally marginalized individuals or groups. Instead, the
Court is concerned with mathematical, formal equality. It explained that while states
need not confer the vote, once they do, they “may not, by later arbitrary and disparate
treatment, value one person’s vote over that of another.” Id. at 104-05. Unlike the individuals in the antidiscrimination cases, who suffered humiliation and stigmatization,
the voters at issue in Bush v. Gore may not even have been aware of the disparity.
180
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C. Liberty as Dignity
1. Liberalism and Individual Self-Determination
The notion that humans deserve respect as free, autonomous, sovereign, and self-determined agents is so entrenched in American po184
litical liberalism that it appears self-evident. Its origins can be traced
back to ancient Greece and Rome, where the Stoics were among the
first thinkers to connect humans’ unique capacity for moral reasoning
185
with their dignity.
This view was subsequently taken by Pico della
186
Mirandola during the Renaissance and John Locke during the En187
lightenment, both of whom maintained that human dignity was derived from a natural freedom that should not be infringed without
188
appropriate justification.
The ultimate advocate of the connection between human liberty
and human dignity was the eighteenth-century German philosopher
184

Although liberalism can encompass a variety of positions (e.g., “new,” “old,”
“revisionist,” “welfare state,” or “social justice” liberalism), see Gerald F. Gaus, The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms, in HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL THEORY 100, 100-14 (Gerald F. Gaus & Chandran Kukathas eds., 2004), it is only relevant for the purposes of
this Article that liberty is at the crux of all liberal theory. The central belief that freedom is normatively basic and restrictions on freedom therefore require justification is
found in the work of modern liberal theorists, such as Joel Feinberg and John Rawls,
and in the work of their predecessors, John Locke and John Stuart Mill. Compare JOEL
FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 9 (1984) (noting that “most writers on our subject have
endorsed a kind of ‘presumption in favor of liberty’” and that “[l]iberty should be the
norm,” while “coercion always needs some special justification”), and JOHN RAWLS,
JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS 44, 112 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001) (contending that “basic liberties
have a special status in view of their priority”), with JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 6
(Longmans, Green, & Co. 1913) (1859) (“[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of
their number, is self-protection.”), and JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT
287 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1963) (1690) (claiming that “all Men are
naturally in . . . a State of perfect Freedom” and that they should be able to do whatever they want “within the bounds of the Law of Nature” (emphasis omitted)).
185
MARVIN PERRY ET AL., WESTERN CIVILIZATION: IDEAS, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY
112-14 (9th ed. 2009).
186
See generally Pico della Mirandola, Oration on the Dignity of Man (1486) (claiming that man’s dignity resides in his ability to direct his future), reprinted in ON THE DIGNITY OF MAN 2, 2-34 (Charles Glenn Wallis et al. eds., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1998) (1965).
187
See LOCKE, supra note 184, at 287.
188
The notion that one’s liberty should not be disturbed without proper political
authority and justification appears in social contract theory as well. See HOBBES, supra
note 103, at 145-54 (“It is manifest, that every Subject has Liberty in all those things,
the right whereof cannot by Covenant be transferred.”); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE
SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 186-89 (G.D.H. Cole trans., J.M. Dent & Sons
1973) (1762) (“Each man alienates . . . by the social contract, only such part of his
powers, goods, and liberty as it is important for the community to control . . . .”).
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Immanuel Kant, who wrote that “humanity so far as it is capable of
189
morality, is the only thing which has dignity.”
Kant claimed that
190
human dignity derives from autonomy —the distinctively human
191
ability to discern the moral law and live by it. In his view, people deserve respect because their capacity for moral direction makes them
192
ends in themselves. The well-known Kantian maxim that people
ought to be treated as ends and not simply as means demonstrates the
level of respect that Kant believed dignity warranted. For Kant, dignity generated not only an obligation to respect people’s free will, but
also the concomitant obligation not to abrogate it by treating them as
193
an instrument of another’s free will.
Although Kant’s work contin189

IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS (1785), reprinted in THE MORAL LAW 114 (H.J. Paton trans., Routledge Classics 2005) (1948)
[hereinafter KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS]; see also IMMANUEL
KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES OF VIRTUE 127 ( James Ellington trans., BobbsMerrill Co. 1964) (1797) (stating that “[h]umanity itself is a dignity”).
190
Autonomy is derived from the ancient Greek words, auto and nomos, which
translate respectively to mean “self” and “law.” Autonomy literally means to give the law
to oneself.
191
See KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS, supra note 189, at
114-15 (“Autonomy is . . . the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature.”). But cf. B.F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY 41-55 (Bantam
Books rev. ed. 1990) (1971) (denying that people have the capacity to be morally responsible in their decisions and that human action cannot be the basis of human dignity because it is determined by factors beyond individual control).
192
This justification for liberty can also ground claims for equality. For example,
some philosophers argue that Kant’s maxim is as much about equality as liberty by citing
the fact that Pufendorf’s De Officio influenced Kant. See, e.g., John Laird, The Ethics of Dignity, 15 PHILOSOPHY 131, 131-32 (1940) (Eng.) (asserting that Kant was “very well acquainted” with Pufendorf and thus likely “influenced” by him). Pufendorf wrote:
In the very name of man a certain dignity is felt to lie, so that the ultimate and
most effective rebuttal of insolence and insults from others is “Look, I am not
a dog, but a man as well as yourself.” Human nature therefore belongs equally to all and no one would or could gladly associate with anyone who does not
value him as a man as well as himself and a partner in the same nature.
SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN ACCORDING TO NATURAL
LAW 61 ( James Tully ed., Michael Silverthorne trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991)
(1673). For a modern view of the connection between equality and liberty, see, for
example, MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX & SOCIAL JUSTICE (1999). Nussbaum contends
that the “idea of equal worth is connected to an idea of liberty: to respect the equal
worth of persons is, among other things, to promote their ability to fashion a life in
accordance with their own view of what is deepest and most important.” Id. at 5.
193
See KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS, supra note 189, at 105
(“Now I say that man, and in general every rational being, exists as an end in himself,
not merely as a means for arbitrary use by this or that will: he must in all his actions,
whether they are directed to himself or to other rational beings, always be viewed at the
same time as an end.”). Isaiah Berlin’s notion of “positive liberty” is analogous. He describes a person’s “wish to be a subject, not an object . . . deciding, not being decided
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ues to be dissected, contested, and reconfigured by contemporary phi194
losophers, he is nevertheless considered by many to be “the father
195
of the modern concept of human dignity.”
Given America’s deeply held values of freedom, individualism, and
autonomy, it is unsurprising that a type of dignity I call liberty as dignity
resonates powerfully with the Court. Unlike equality as dignity, this
form of dignity is neither intrinsic nor universal. A person has liberty
as dignity only insofar as he can make autonomous choices. Because it
is capacity driven, dignity of this kind is contingent—one can gain or
lose it over a lifetime. For example, young children and mentally incapacitated individuals do not qualify for liberty as dignity, but it is not
foreclosed to them if and when they gain mental competence.
Liberty as dignity commands respect at two levels: first, respect for
individual choice, and second, respect for individuals because they
have the capacity for choice. These two forms of respect are mutually
reinforcing. Since exercising our free will is the mechanism through
which we express our liberty as dignity, it is especially important that
we encourage and support autonomous decisions. At the same time,
because people have the unique ability to shape their future through
their actions, they must not be treated strictly as objects of others’
needs or desires. Unlike equality as dignity, liberty as dignity can be
violated, diminished, or even destroyed by actions that fail to appropriately respect human self-determination.
2. Securing the Conditions for Self-Realization
The Court’s application of liberty as dignity appears most prominently in cases involving personal decisions, namely the choice to have

for, self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I were a
thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human rule, that is, of conceiving
goals and policies of my own and realising them.” ISAIAH BERLIN, TWO CONCEPTS OF
LIBERTY (1958), reprinted in LIBERTY 166, 178 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002).
194
Kant’s influence is evident in the work of many of his strongest critics. See, e.g.,
ROBERT B. PIPPIN, HEGEL’S IDEALISM: THE SATISFACTIONS OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 1624 (1989) (explaining that Hegel’s concerns about Kant’s philosophy shaped Hegel’s
own account of morality); 1 ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, THE WORLD AS WILL AND REPRESENTATION 415-534 (E.F.J. Payne trans., Dover Publ’ns 1966) (1958) (rejecting rationalistic, Kantian conceptions of the world but also acknowledging Kant’s critical contributions in this area); Ayn Rand, Brief Summary, OBJECTIVIST, Sept. 1971, at 1, 4
(opposing Kantian liberalism in favor of her own theory of objectivism).
195
Giovanni Bognetti, The Concept of Human Dignity in European and U.S. Constitutionalism, in EUROPEAN AND U.S. CONSTITUTIONALISM 85, 89 (Georg Nolte ed., 2005).
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196

an abortion or engage in same-sex intimacy.
In these contexts, liberty as dignity has played a critical role in securing the choices that
individuals make to further their identity and personal goals, and it
appears poised to have an even greater influence in the future.
The Court first invoked the language of liberty as dignity in the
abortion context in the 1986 case, Thornburgh v. American College of Ob197
stetricians and Gynecologists. Thornburgh involved a challenge to certain
198
provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act that related to
informed consent, dissemination of material about abortion, physician
199
After citing cases where the
reporting, and post-viability abortions.
Court had previously cordoned off individual decisions from govern200
ment interference, the Court placed liberty as dignity at the crux of
its decision striking down the provisions as unconstitutional.
Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, maintained that “[f]ew decisions are more personal and intimate, more properly private, or more
basic to individual dignity and autonomy, than a woman’s decision . . .

196

The Court also has invoked liberty as dignity to uphold First Amendment speech
rights and Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections against self-incrimination. In the
landmark case Cohen v. California, the Court reasoned that no approach, except freedom of speech, “would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon
which our political system rests.” 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971); see also Simon & Schuster, Inc.
v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991) (holding as
unconstitutional a statute that provided disincentives for particular speech by felons).
In Stanford v. Texas, the Court stated that the First Amendment, along with the Fourth
and Fifth, “are indeed closely related, safeguarding not only privacy and protection
against self-incrimination but conscience and human dignity and freedom of expression
as well.” 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965) (quoting Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 376 (1959)
(Douglas, J., dissenting)); cf. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) (restricting
an incompetent individual’s right to represent himself in court so as to protect his personal integrity as dignity); Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 3, 22-23 (1990)
(restricting a newspaper’s use of defamatory speech in order to affirm an individual’s
right to protect his personal integrity as dignity). For further discussion of the intersections between dignity and speech rights, see Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, A Perspective on
Human Dignity, the First Amendment, and the Right of Publicity, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1345, 135055 (2009), and Frederick Schauer, Speaking of Dignity, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS:
HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES, supra note 13, at 178, 178-91.
197
476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986), overruled in part by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion).
198
18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3201–3220 (1982), invalidated in part by Thornburgh, 476
U.S. 747.
199
Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 750.
200
See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 440, 454-55 (1972) (upholding the
right of unmarried couples to access contraception); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 485-86 (1965) (prohibiting the state from interfering with married couples’ right
to use contraception); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400-03 (1923) (recognizing
the right to direct the education and upbringing of one’s children).
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whether to end her pregnancy. A woman’s right to make that choice
201
freely is fundamental.”
In so holding, the Court highlighted that
“measures seemingly designed to prevent a woman . . . from exercising
202
her freedom of choice” were inconsistent with liberty as dignity.
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, a plurality of the Court again employed liberty as dignity in the abortion con203
The constitutionality of provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortext.
204
tion Control Act was again the material issue in Casey.
As amended
in 1988 and 1989, the Act, in relevant part, stipulated a twenty-four
hour waiting period before an abortion procedure, parental consent
with the option of judicial bypass for minors, spousal notification for
205
Unlike in
married women, and physician reporting requirements.
Thornburgh, the Court upheld all of the statutory provisions except the
spousal notification requirement, which violated the Court’s newly
206
proffered undue burden standard.
The plurality was careful to note that although the undue burden
test was a step away from Roe v. Wade’s framework, the Court’s interest
207
in protecting liberty as dignity was unwavering. As in Thornburgh, the
opinion placed abortion on the same legal plane as “personal decisions
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships,
208
child rearing, and education,” but then took a significant step in a
new direction. In the now famous “mystery of life” passage, Justice
O’Connor, writing for the controlling plurality, announced that
[t]hese matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.
Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of person209
hood were they formed under compulsion of the State.

Just how far the Court is willing to press liberty as dignity to safeguard individuals’ life choices remains to be seen, but the Court’s
201

Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 772.
Id. at 759.
203
505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (plurality opinion).
204
Id. at 844.
205
18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3203–3220 (1990).
206
Casey, 505 U.S. at 879-901.
207
Id. at 874-79. But see infra notes 302-14 and accompanying text (illustrating
how this commitment to liberty is shifting in the abortion context).
208
Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
209
Id.
202
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opinion in the landmark case Lawrence v. Texas hints at an answer. In
a decision invalidating Texas’s antisodomy statute, the Court de210
fended “choices central to personal dignity and autonomy.” Writing
for the majority, Justice Kennedy explained that “adults may choose to
enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their
own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. . . . The
liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the
211
right to make this choice.”
The most telling use of dignity in Lawrence, however, appears in
the Court’s recitation of the so-called “mystery of life” passage from
Casey. Confirming that “our laws and tradition afford constitutional
protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation,
212
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education,”
the Court went on to restate that substantive due process protects
“choices central to personal dignity . . . . [such as] the right to define
one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of
213
the mystery of human life.”
As some commentators have noted in analyzing Lawrence, the
Court’s use of liberty as dignity takes “the Court further than in any
214
215
previous decision” and “may presage a new jurisprudence” that
forbids states from restricting any activity that is “somehow connected
with efforts ‘to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of
216
the universe, and of the mystery of human life.’”
210

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
Although the Court mentions privacy, at least one commentator has claimed that liberty as dignity “is doing all the work.” Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, 2002-2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21, 34 (2003).
211
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. Importantly, the Court also invokes personal integrity as dignity in its claims that individuals have a right to be free from the demeaning
nature of a law that condemns their homosexual activity. The Court explains that because the Texas statute required the state to add individuals convicted of same-sex
sodomy to its registry of sex offenders, it stigmatizes and demeans the very “existence”
of homosexual individuals. Id. at 576-78. Although the Court ultimately grounded its
decision in liberty as dignity, its awareness of personal integrity as dignity in this context is unmistakable.
212
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573-74.
213
Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
214
Neomi Rao, On the Use and Abuse of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 14 COLUM. J.
EUR. L. 201, 241 (2008).
215
Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102
MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1583 (2004); see also Yoshino, supra note 170, at 778-81 (arguing
that the Court’s decision reveals a hybrid liberty-equality claim that may have force in
future cases).
216
Lund & McGinnis, supra note 215, at 1583 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574).
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If this analysis is correct, then one could imagine the Court revisiting issues like physician-assisted suicide, which it struck down before
Lawrence under a narrower reading of substantive due process that
217
made no normative use of dignity. There is surely an argument that
competent individuals who opt for a physician’s assistance in ending
their lives are defining their existence and unraveling “the mystery of
218
human life.” While it is unclear whether this position would succeed,
Justice Scalia was not understating the case when he observed that the
219
Court’s reasoning in Lawrence “will have far-reaching implications.”
D. Personal Integrity as Dignity
1. Aristotelian Virtue and the Dignified, Whole Self
In a pluralistic, liberal democracy that values equality and liberty
as dignity, it may seem anachronistic to suggest that humans are more
or less dignified on the basis of how they conduct themselves and how
they are treated. Nevertheless, we say that people who persevere in
the face of adversity, maintain composure in spite of fear, and display
self-control despite great suffering are dignified. In contrast, people
who become vulnerable to their circumstances, express unharnessed
appetites, and expose their bodily nakedness or mental fragility are
undignified. Most people live at a baseline between the two extremes,
220
with few achieving the highest level of human virtue, and some falling intermittently into disrepute.
217

See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 705-06 (1997) (upholding Washington State’s statutory prohibition against physician-assisted suicide as constitutional
under the Fourteenth Amendment).
218
In Lawrence, the Court appears open to an expansive interpretation of substantive due process:
[T]hose who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses . . . knew times can
blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought
necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own
search for greater freedom.
539 U.S. at 578-79. But see Yale Kamisar, Foreword: Can Glucksberg Survive Lawrence?
Another Look at the End of Life and Autonomy, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1453, 1466-67 (2008)
(concluding that the Court is unlikely to overrule Glucksberg because physician-assisted
suicide, among other things, does not involve a “politically vulnerable group,” nor does
it have an “emerging [societal] awareness”).
219
539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
220
As a matter of law, most states do not require individuals to engage in supererogatory behavior. For example, the vast majority of states do not compel bystanders
to provide emergency aid to people in need, or even call 911. See, e.g., MASS. ANN.
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This modern use of dignity is part of a discourse on excellence
and virtue that dates back to the ancient philosophers of Greece.
221
Aristotle, and the moral theorists before him, employed the Greek
word arête, meaning virtue or excellence, to describe a natural or artificial object that has become the best example of the thing that it
222
is.
The arête of a knife, for example, is its sharpness; the arête of a
race horse is its speed. While human arête could be exemplified by the
223
Aristotle instead unAthenian statesman or the Homeric warrior,
derstood that a variety of human characteristics—deliberation, wisdom, self-respect, courage, and self-control, among others—could
224
make humans fitting, or excellent, examples of their kind.
Drawing on this view of arête, the Roman philosopher Cicero subsequently adopted the language of dignity to describe the quality of
achieving human excellence. In his famous work, De Officiis, Cicero invoked the word dignitatem to explain that “[w]e must empty ourselves
of every agitation of the spirit . . . in order to gain that tranquility of
225
spirit . . . which ensures both constancy and standing.”
In another
passage from the same treatise, he employs dignitas to explain that if
humans “wish to reflect on the excellence and worthiness of our nature, we shall realize how dishonourable it is to sink into luxury and to
live a soft and effeminate lifestyle, but how honourable to live thriftily,
LAWS ch. 112, § 12B (LexisNexis 2004) (providing legal immunity to physicians, physician assistants, and nurses who choose to provide emergency medical services); N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3000-a(1) (McKinney 2007) (preventing legal suits against people
who provide emergency medical services, but not requiring such behavior). Exceptions to that general standard include Minnesota and Vermont, both of which have
Good Samaritan laws that require any person at the scene of an emergency to provide
reasonable assistance to another person in need. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01
(West 2000) (mandating that people provide “reasonable assistance” to someone who
“is exposed to or has suffered grave physical harm,” so long as the person does not endanger himself in the process); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(a) (2002) (requiring “reasonable assistance” by a person who is aware that another is in “grave physical danger”
and who can help without endangering himself).
221
Socrates, for example, suggests that wisdom is the most important human virtue because it allows man to make the best use of his other assets, such as health,
wealth, justice, and courage. 2 PLATO, Euthydemus (c. 390 B.C.E.), in LACHES PROTAGORAS MENO EUTHYDEMUS 373, 411-13 (W.R.M. Lamb trans., Harvard Univ. Press
1977).
222
Richard Parry, Ancient Ethical Theory, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Aug. 7,
2009), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-ancient.
223
Id.
224
See generally ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE bks. III-IV, at
54-115 (R.W. Browne trans., London, George Bell & Sons 1889) (c. 384 B.C.E.) (setting forth the variety of moral virtues).
225
CICERO, supra note 97, ¶ 69.
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226

strictly, with self-restraint, and soberly.” Together, these excerpts call
on humans to express those characteristics befitting the excellence of
227
human nature.
Importantly, Aristotle and his philosophical progeny believed that
people’s personal circumstances may affect, or even limit, their ability
to express the dignity associated with human excellence and virtue.
For instance, to display perseverance, one must face adversity; to exhibit courage, one must confront fear; and to express fortitude, one
228
must resist fatigue. Conversely, some lives are so dis-integrated that
individuals do not have the opportunity to exercise or develop the ca229
pacities for human excellence or dignity.
In these latter cases,
people cannot become virtuous or dignified examples of humanity

226

Id. ¶ 106.
A humorous exposition of this use of dignity can be found in the works of the
ancient Roman dramatist Plautus, who applied this form of dignity in a number of his
slapstick comedies. See, e.g., PLAUTUS, Pseudolus (191 B.C.E.) (explaining that it is fitting, “dignum,” to send letters of good wishes to people they befit, “dignis,” but concluding that because his interlocutor is not worthy, “dignum,” of such a letter, he will not
bother sending him one), in THE POT OF GOLD AND OTHER PLAYS 217, 255 (E.F. Watling trans., 1965); PLAUTUS, The Slip-Knot (192 B.C.E.), in THREE PLAYS OF PLAUTUS 51,
164 (F.A. Wright trans., 1925) (commenting that one character’s form is fitting, “digna
forma,” of his profession—that he looks like the beggar he is).
228
Cicero explained that it is “a great and admirable distinction to have borne adversity wisely, not to have been crushed by misfortune, and not to have lost dignity in a
difficult situation.” CICERO, DE ORATORE bk. II, ¶¶ 346-47 (H. Rackham ed., E.W. Sutton trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1959) (55 B.C.E.). Accordingly, actions that are extraordinary in one context may be unremarkable in others. The fact that Nelson
Mandela completed his law degree from the University of London while he was a political prisoner in South Africa suggests he possesses an extraordinary amount of mental
strength, courage, and perseverance. We would not say the same thing about his fellow graduates who completed their degrees in residence.
229
Martha Nussbaum’s excellent work on human capabilities expresses this Aristotelian view. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP 159-60 (2006) (describing the capabilities approach to dignity, which “sees rationality and animality as thoroughly unified”); NUSSBAUM, supra note
192, at 39-47 (exploring the “central human functional capabilities” and contending
that if a life lacks any of these capabilities that it “will fall short of being a good human
life” and thus deprive one of his “dignity”); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 70-73 (2000) (“We judge, frequently
enough, that a life has been so impoverished that it is not worthy of the dignity of the
human being, that it is a life in which one goes on living, but more or less like an animal, unable to develop and exercise one’s human powers.”); Nussbaum, supra note 66,
at 351-80 (describing “ten core capabilities” that “are necessary conditions of a life worthy of human dignity” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
227
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because, to put it in Aristotelian terms, they lack the basic “wholeness”
230
that one needs as a baseline from which to excel.
I refer to the type of dignity that applies both to people who convey
a constellation of virtuous characteristics and to those who are prevented by circumstance from expressing such characteristics as personal
integrity as dignity. This form of dignity has several features.
First, personal integrity as dignity starts with the Aristotelian notion that humans cannot express this form of dignity unless they are
integrated, whole selves. I use the word integrity to define this form
of dignity because it is derived from the Latin word integritas, mean231
A person who
ing “wholeness” or “undivided or unbroken state.”
has personal integrity as dignity can excel because he is morally,
mentally, and physically intact, whereas a person who has fallen below a certain human baseline is “in pieces.” We might colloquially say
that they have “fallen apart,” “broken down,” or “dis-integrated.”
Second, personal integrity as dignity commands internal and external respect. It can be destroyed by one’s own actions—as when a
person acts “beneath his dignity”—or it can be destroyed by the actions
of others—as when a person is “robbed of his dignity.” In either sense,
a person can be rendered undignified by acts that degrade, debase, or
diminish the individual’s appearance as a collected, unified self.
Third, the language we use to describe dignified and undignified
states illustrates that personal integrity as dignity is presentational and
expressive. How a person conducts himself publicly matters; whether
a person speaks, walks, and carries himself with a sense of dignity
counts. A slave, who has been deprived of equality and liberty as dignity, can nevertheless possess personal integrity as dignity by expressing his sense of moral worth and self-respect in the face of oppression.
In so doing, the slave is expressing that despite what his owner has
taken from him, he remains whole, complete, and dignified.
By contrast, how others treat a person also has expressive implications for personal integrity as dignity. Recall the internationally televised capture of Saddam Hussein by U.S. forces in Iraq. Stripped of
his military uniform and subjected to a public delousing, Hussein was
232
reduced to a pale specter of his former self.
The expressive and
230

See MICHAEL A. SMITH, HUMAN DIGNITY AND THE COMMON GOOD IN THE ARISTOTELIAN-THOMISTIC TRADITION 6-15 (1995) (describing Aristotle’s theory of the
“one” or “whole” person).
231
5 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 368 (1961).
232
See After the Euphoria, ECONOMIST, Dec. 20, 2003, at 79, 79-80 (describing the
capture of Saddam Hussein and explaining that “[s]ome Iraqis felt that the sight of
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public function of the televised photos was to demonstrate that American military forces had “broken” Hussein. They had destroyed his
personal integrity as dignity by “dressing him down,” both literally and
figuratively, and demonstrating that the undignified, debased, and
degraded sub-human on television no longer posed a world threat.
Fourth, as the presentational and expressive nature of personal integrity as dignity suggests, there is often an aesthetic element to this
form of dignity. People who appear poised, graceful, polished, and
stately exude “an air of dignity.” They can present themselves as a
strong, unified whole. By contrast, people who look unsightly, unseemly, uncomely, inelegant, disgraceful, or even revolting appear
undignified. The latter have lost their self-respect—in many cases, it
233
has been taken from them—and they have “fallen apart” under
conditions that are aesthetically unsettling, embarrassing, humiliating,
234
shameful, disgraceful, demeaning, and self-destructive.
2. Protecting Individuals from Dis-Integration
Personal integrity as dignity can be threatened in two contexts.
The first circumstance occurs when people are judged on the basis of
a single, personal trait that others deem inconsistent with human virtue or excellence. The second case arises when people are unable to
present themselves as composed, dignified, whole selves capable of
human virtue. The Supreme Court has invoked personal integrity as
dignity in both situations to protect individuals from views or activities
that are damaging to the integrated self.

Saddam looking so unkempt and submissive made those who cowered in his shadow
seem slightly pathetic”).
233
Pritchard, supra note 33, at 301 (internal quotation marks omitted). Pritchard
explains that “whether one can ‘hold himself together’” is central to the notion of personal integrity. Id.
234
Shaming and humiliation occur in a variety of settings and create negative externalities. See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME,
AND THE LAW 172-221 (2004) (criticizing the use of stigmatization, shame, and humiliation as a cure for criminal wrongdoing and perceived social degeneracy); DANIEL J.
SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET
76-102 (2007) (demonstrating the individual and social costs of unconstrained gossip,
slander, and rumor in cyberspace); Dan M. Kahan, What’s Really Wrong with Shaming
Sanctions, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2075, 2075-76 (2006) (concluding that shaming punishments
are not acceptable to a significant segment of society and therefore recanting his previous argument that shaming sanctions are expressively equal to imprisonment).
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a. When the Self Is Reduced to a Single Trait
Society frequently judges people on the basis of one particular
characteristic. In some cases, attention is drawn to a trait because possessing it is what makes someone a particularly virtuous or excellent
235
(arête) example of that which they do. For example, an opera singer
is commended for a strong voice, a surgeon for steady hands, and a
ballet dancer for graceful feet. In other cases, a particular characteristic is singled out to suggest that people who possess it are not, or cannot become, exemplars of humanity. Society frequently characterizes
alcoholics, drug addicts, and thieves, for instance, on the basis of a
trait that others believe prevents them from achieving human excellence. The defining trait or characteristic is considered so shameful as
to disqualify the people who possess or express it from a trajectory of
human excellence or virtue.
The Court has relied on personal integrity as dignity to describe and
prevent the harm that results when a personal trait of this kind is thrust
into the public arena, causing all other personal features to fade into the
background. Examples can be found in the Court’s First Amendment
defamation and Sixth Amendment self-representation cases.
In defamation suits, the Court has opined that when one alleged
negative fact about a person (whether true or false) becomes all that a
person’s social group sees and knows of that person, his personal integrity as dignity is at risk. In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., the Court explored whether a newspaper article, which implied that the petitioner
had lied under oath during a judicial proceeding, was constitutionally
236
protected speech.
The article, in relevant part, suggested that Milkovich, a high-school wrestling coach, had knowingly committed perjury
during a hearing to investigate an altercation between his team and a
team from another high school that resulted in injuries to several
237
people. Milkovich maintained that the attack on his veracity damaged
238
his reputation and his lifetime occupation as a coach and teacher.
Although the Court had previously recognized the First Amendment’s “vital guarantee of free and uninhibited discussion of public
239
issues” for defendants in defamation actions, it chose instead to rec235

It is not accidental that we refer to people who are technically gifted in the fine
arts as virtuosos.
236
497 U.S. 1, 3 (1990).
237
Id. at 3-5.
238
Id. at 6-7.
239
Id. at 22; cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (rejecting the notion
that the petitioner’s decision to display a vulgar four-letter word on his jacket
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ognize another side to the equation; namely, a strong interest in protecting people against affronts to their personal integrity as dignity.
Quoting an earlier opinion by Justice Stewart, the Court explained
that “‘[t]he right of a man to the protection of his own reputation
from unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our
basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human be240
ing.’” In restricting the newspaper’s speech, the Court gave greater
weight to Milkovich’s interest in protecting his personal integrity as
241
dignity than the journalist’s or public’s interest in liberty as dignity.
The Court similarly has invoked personal integrity as dignity to
prevent an individual from ruining his own reputation. The decision
in Indiana v. Edwards is a rare case in which the Court limits individual
242
autonomy to protect personal integrity as dignity. The case involved
a mentally ill man who was judged competent to stand trial and who
243
invoked his constitutional right to self-representation. In a 7-2 decision, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to selfrepresentation can be abrogated when exercising that right would not
244
“affirm the dignity” of the defendant.
In the Court’s view, although liberty as dignity underlies the selfrepresentation right, the “spectacle that could well result from [the
defendant’s] self-representation at trial is at least as likely to prove
245
humiliating as ennobling.”
Whether the attack on a person’s reputation is external (as in Milkovich) or inadvertently internal (as in Edwards), the Court’s opinions suggest that when a single negative
attribute is permitted to overshadow an entire persona, personal integrity as dignity is diminished.

amounted to “fighting words” likely to incite violence). In contrast to the Court in
Milkovich, the majority in Cohen focused on the speaker’s interest in liberty as dignity.
Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, reasoned that although freedom of expression
can create “verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive utterance,” there is “no other
approach [which] would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice
upon which our political system rests.” Id. at 24-25.
240
Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 22 (emphasis added) (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383
U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
241
Cf. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21 (noting that a decision to close off discourse to prevent others from hearing it requires a showing of intolerable invasion of substantial
privacy interests).
242
554 U.S. 164, 176 (2008).
243
Id. at 167.
244
Id. at 176 (quoting McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176-77 (1984)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
245
Id.
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b. When the Self Cannot Express Its Wholeness
Members of the Court also have invoked personal integrity as dignity to describe situations in which a person is only able to present
himself as a part of his full self, rather than a unified, composed, or
collected whole. Justice Scalia proffers such a notion of personal integrity as dignity four times in his dissenting opinion in National Trea246
sury Employees Union v. Von Raab.
In Von Raab, the Court held that
the U.S. Customs Service’s drug-screening program, which compelled
employees to submit to urinalysis, was reasonable as applied to certain
employees because the testing furthered a compelling government in247
terest in safeguarding the nation’s borders.
Rejecting the Court’s reasoning, Justice Scalia asserted that demanding an employee “perform ‘an excretory function traditionally
248
shielded by great privacy,’” “while ‘a monitor of the same sex . . .
249
remains close at hand to listen for the normal sounds’” is “offensive
250
to personal dignity.” What makes it an “affront to [the employees’]
251
dignity” is not just that the drug test is involuntary, but that it is in252
Justice Scalia depicted the
trusive, embarrassing, and undignified.
drug testing in this way to illustrate that it is an “immolation of . . .
253
254
human dignity” tied to the “coarsening of our national manners”
and our failure to respect people’s desire to present themselves as
dignified, composed, and complete.
The idea that personal integrity as dignity is implicated when the
state observes individuals engaged in less-than-savory activities before
246

489 U.S. 656, 680-81, 686-87 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 672 (majority opinion).
248
Id. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n,
489 U.S. 602, 626 (1989)).
249
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting id. at 661 (majority opinion)).
250
Id.
251
Id. at 686.
252
Id. at 686-87. In his dissent in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, a drugtesting case decided the same day as Von Raab, Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, concluded that compelled drug testing “significantly intrudes on the ‘personal
privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State’ against which the
Fourth Amendment protects.” 489 U.S. 602, 644 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966)). Justice Marshall noted
that in “[o]ur culture the excretory functions are shielded by more or less absolute
privacy, so much so that situations in which this privacy is violated are experienced as
extremely distressing, as detracting from one’s dignity and self esteem.” Id. at 646
(quoting Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 487 (1968)).
253
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 681 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
254
Id. at 687.
247
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they have a chance to collect themselves is not one held only by Justice
Scalia. Writing for the full Court in Hudson v. Michigan, a case involving the failure of the police to announce adequately their presence
255
before conducting a warrantless search, Justice Scalia explained one
dignity-related purpose of the knock-and-announce rule:
[T]he knock-and-announce rule protects those elements of privacy and
dignity that can be destroyed by a sudden entrance. It gives residents
the “opportunity to prepare themselves for” the entry of the police.
“The brief interlude between announcement and entry with a warrant
may be the opportunity that an individual has to pull on clothes or get
out of bed.” In other words, it assures the opportunity to collect oneself
256
before answering the door.

In Hudson, as in Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Von Raab, the search
that affronted personal integrity as dignity involved exposing an individual to others when he was indecent, improper, undressed, ungrace257
ful, or uncollected—in short, undignified.
Like circumstances that
reduce a whole individual to a solitary trait, situations that prevent an
individual from expressing his wholeness are dis-integrating and function as an affront to personal integrity as dignity.
E. Collective Virtue as Dignity
1. Communitarianism and Humanity’s Excellence
Thus far we have traced institutional status as dignity to aristocracy, equality as dignity to egalitarianism, liberty as dignity to political
liberalism, and integrity as dignity to Aristotelian-virtue theory. The
258
final type of dignity, collective virtue as dignity, finds its roots in communitarianism, but also expresses some elements of other concepts.
Collective virtue as dignity addresses how members of civilized socie255

547 U.S. 586, 588 (2006).
Id. at 594 (citations omitted) (quoting Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393
n.5 (1997)).
257
Cf. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004) (distinguishing
searches of vehicles, which do not implicate personal integrity as dignity, from searches
of individuals, and stating that “the reasons that might support a requirement of some
level of suspicion in the case of highly intrusive searches of the person—dignity and
privacy interests of the person being searched—simply do not carry over to vehicles”).
258
Although there is not a single brand of communitarianism, most political philosophers labeled as communitarian thinkers reject the Rawlsian view that the principal purpose of government is to protect individual liberty interests. See, e.g., MICHAEL J.
SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982) (arguing that Rawlsian liberalism is overly individualistic to the detriment of society).
256
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ties ought to behave and ought to be treated in order to respect the
collective dignity of humanity. It is less concerned with individual
dignity per se than with how a society values the totality of human life.
Collective virtue as dignity has several defining characteristics.
Notably, it extends the Aristotelian notion of personal excellence to
the human community writ large. Instead of distinguishing one person from another on the basis of individual virtue, collective virtue as
dignity refers to the excellence of the human species. This excellence
recognizes humans as the best example (arête) of the animal king259
dom. Accordingly, collective virtue as dignity is expressed when
260
people behave and are treated in ways worthy of humans, not beasts.
When society treats people in ways that are in-humane, or when
people engage in activities that are de-humanizing, collective virtue as
dignity diminishes.
Collective virtue as dignity is therefore both iconographic and expressive. Treating a person in a subhuman manner is wrong not only
for the effect it has on that individual, but also for the consequences it
has on collective humanity and society. For example, critics of torture
seek to prohibit the practice not simply because it violates the autonomy of the tortured individuals and subjects them to extreme pain
and suffering, but also because torture is anathema to civilized socie261
ties bound by law.
People ought to rule with laws rather than with
262
Torture, on that
brutality and savagery unfitting even for beasts.
view, undermines collective virtue as dignity.

259

There are a variety of perspectives on what renders humanity unique among
creatures. See, e.g., Rolston, supra note 61, at 135 (considering the biological distinctiveness of humans as compared to animals); see also Bostrom, supra note 68 at 196-98
(discussing human dignity and possible implications of human cloning); Gilbert Meilaender, Human Dignity: Exploring and Explicating the Council’s Vision (stating that dignity characterizes humans as the rational species), in HUMAN DIGNITY AND BIOETHICS,
supra note 30, at 253, 253.
260
See, e.g., Leon Kass, Human Dignity (introducing a set of readings highlighting
the many facets of humanity), in BEING HUMAN: CORE READINGS IN THE HUMANITIES
568 (Leon Kass ed., 2004).
261
Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1709-34 (2005).
262
Several international laws prohibit torture. See International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights art. 7, Dec. 19, 1966, S. EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S.
171 (“No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 4, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20
(1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (requiring states to “ensure that all acts of torture are offences under its criminal law”). For further discussion of the view that participating in
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Conversely, when individuals engage in undignified conduct, their
acts may threaten humanity’s collective virtue as dignity. Consider the
famous French dwarf-tossing case. In that case, the French Conseil
d’État granted police power to prevent any public activities that failed
to respect human dignity. Accordingly, two municipalities banned the
263
spectacle of dwarf-tossing in local clubs.
Manuel Wackenheim, one
of the dwarfs, challenged the ban by arguing that he freely participated in the activity, was paid, and that the ban would result in his unemployment. The Conseil d’État ruled that using humans as projectiles was degrading to all members of society because it violated an
264
overriding sense of human dignity (i.e., collective virtue as dignity).
As the dwarf-tossing case demonstrates, collective virtue as dignity
may overcome arguments for autonomy and often serves to constrain
individual behavior for the good of society. In a community that believes prostitution is an affront to women’s collective dignity, it is irrelevant that individual women find the practice empowering or view it
as an exercise of their liberty as dignity. Similarly, “slavery is a wrong
even if it is not experienced as negative by the slave and even if the
slave maintains a substantial amount of de facto autonomy” because
265
the practice offends collective virtue as dignity.
Whether we are discussing the legality of torture, dwarf-tossing, or
prostitution, the community defines collective virtue as dignity. This
is consistent with the communitarian view that moral judgment depends on the actual beliefs, practices, and institutions that create
communities at specific times and places. Prohibited conduct considered offensive and degrading in one society might not be in another.
2. Advancing Notions of a Decent Society
The Supreme Court invokes collective virtue as dignity to stop or
limit activities that do not comport with how a decent society should
respect the dignity of human life. This approach is evident in the
Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, which limits the death pe266
nalty to mentally competent adults and precludes certain forms of
torture harms liberal institutions, see David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking
Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1425-61 (2005), and Waldron, supra note 261, at 1709-34.
263
CE Ass., Oct. 27, 1995, Rec. Lebon 372, http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/
centers/transnational/work_new/french/case.php?id=1024.
264
Id.
265
Kent Greenawalt, Dignity and Victimhood, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 779, 781 (2000).
266
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005) (setting aside the death sentence of a juvenile under the age of eighteen); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318-21
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267

punishment, and in the Court’s search and seizure decisions, which
exclude evidentiary material obtained in a manner that would
268
“shock[] the conscience.”
The Court’s use of collective virtue as
dignity is also powerfully evident in its recent abortion jurisprudence.
In limiting the reach of the death penalty to mentally competent
adults, the Court looked beyond its standard tests to conclude that ci269
vilized societies do not execute the mentally insane, the mentally re270
271
tarded, or juvenile convicts.
The Court in Ford v. Wainwright considered whether inflicting the death penalty on a prisoner who is
272
Observing the
mentally insane violates the Eighth Amendment.
“natural abhorrence civilized societies feel” at executing an insane
prisoner, as well as the national “intuition that such an execution
simply offends humanity,” the Court ruled the practice unconstitu273
tional. In so holding, the Court aimed “to protect the dignity of so274
ciety itself from the barbarity of exacting mindless vengeance.”
Confronted with the impending execution of a mentally retarded
prisoner, the Court in Atkins v. Virginia similarly invoked collective vir275
Emphasizing that the Eighth Amendment draws on
tue as dignity.
“the ‘evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a matur276
ing society,’” the Court explained that whether the execution of a
mentally retarded person violates the Amendment “is judged not by
the standards that prevailed in 1685 when Lord Jeffreys presided over
the ‘Bloody Assizes’ or when the Bill of Rights was adopted, but rather
277
by those that currently prevail.”
After observing widespread condemnation of the practice by state legislatures, the Court held that ex-

(2002) (holding as unconstitutional the execution of mentally retarded prisoners);
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986) (plurality opinion) (finding the execution of mentally ill persons unconstitutional).
267
See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 (2002) (stating that if true, petitioner’s
allegations that he was handcuffed to a hitching post for seven hours in the sun with
almost no breaks would establish an Eighth Amendment violation).
268
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
269
Ford, 477 U.S. at 410.
270
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
271
Roper, 543 U.S. at 560.
272
477 U.S. at 399.
273
Id. at 409-10.
274
Id. at 410.
275
536 U.S. 304.
276
Id. at 311-12 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
277
Id. at 311.
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ecuting mentally retarded prisoners violates the “‘dignity of man’” at
278
the root of the Eighth Amendment.
In Roper v. Simmons, the Court went one step further, asking not
only whether the execution of juveniles offended national opinion,
279
Drawing atbut also whether it faced international condemnation.
tention to the fact that the United States was the only country that
sanctioned the death penalty for juveniles, the Court noted that foreign laws confirm the Court’s view that certain acts must be prohi280
bited to “secure individual freedom and preserve human dignity.”
These values, the Court explained, “are central to the American experience and remain essential to our present-day self-definition and na281
tional identity.”
To permit states to execute juveniles not only
would be out of step with international consensus, but also would diminish the nation’s collective virtue as dignity.
The Court’s invocation of collective virtue as dignity is not limited to
its death penalty jurisprudence. In Hope v. Pelzer, the Court concluded
that state prison guards violated an inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights
when they handcuffed him to a hitching post for seven hours in the sun,
shirtless, and with no access to a bathroom as punishment for disruptive
282
conduct. Describing Hope’s treatment as “antithetical to human dig283
nity” and reiterating that the “basic concept underlying the Eighth
284
Amendment . . . is nothing less than the dignity of man,” the Court
concluded that modern understandings of collective decency and hu285
man dignity preclude the use of hitching posts.
As in Atkins and Roper, the Court in Hope examined societal standards to determine the degree to which the punishment at issue is out
286
Its determinaof sync with “‘contemporary concepts of decency.’”
287
tion that “[t]he obvious cruelty inherent in this practice” is imper278

Id. (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 100).
543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005).
280
Id. at 578.
281
Id.
282
536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002). The Court noted in particular that the punishment
“subjected him to a substantial risk of physical harm, to unnecessary pain caused by the
handcuffs . . . , to unnecessary exposure to the heat of the sun, to prolonged thirst and
taunting, and to a deprivation of bathroom breaks that created a risk of particular discomfort and humiliation.” Id. at 738.
283
Id. at 745.
284
Id. at 738 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
285
Id. at 745-46.
286
Id. at 742 (quoting Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1306 (5th Cir. 1974)).
287
Id. at 745.
279
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missible “under ‘precepts of civilization which we profess to pos288
sess’” demonstrates that collective virtue as dignity is at the crux of
the Court’s decision.
Just last Term, the Court used similar reasoning in Brown v. Plata,
a case involving Eighth Amendment violations suffered by California’s
prison population as the result of severe and pervasive prison over289
crowding.
The majority, which affirmed the order of a three-judge
panel directing the Governor to reduce the prison population, did
not hesitate to call California’s prison conditions “grossly inade290
quate.”
In describing the constitutional violations suffered by prisoners needing mental health treatment, the Court noted that overcrowding caused California prisoners to have a suicide rate eighty
percent higher than the national prison population average, and that
due to bed shortages at least one suicidal prisoner was “held in . . . a
cage for nearly 24 hours, standing in a pool of his own urine, unres291
ponsive and nearly catatonic.”
The Court explained that while “prisoners may be deprived of
rights that are fundamental to liberty,” they nevertheless “retain the
essence of human dignity inherent in all persons . . . [that] animates
the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual pu292
nishment.” When a state facility deprives its citizens of basic sustenance, be it food or medical care, it acts in a manner “incompatible
with the concept of human dignity and has no place in civilized socie293
ty.”
The Court’s invocation of collective virtue as dignity reaffirms
its view in Hope that certain prison conditions violate the Eighth

288

Id. at 742 (quoting Gates, 501 F.2d at 1306). The Court’s decision relies heavily
on its earlier opinion in Trop, in which it held that revoking a U.S. soldier’s citizenship
as punishment for wartime desertion would drastically alter our collective conception
of appropriate punishment and our collective virtue as dignity. 356 U.S. at 87-88, 10304. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren explained that “[t]he basic concept
underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man. While the
State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.” Id. at 100.
289
131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011).
290
Id.
291
Id. at 1924. The Court also highlighted the abysmal medical care in California
prisons. In particular, the majority referenced data that, due to inadequate medical
care and unsafe conditions, a “preventable or possibly preventable death occurred once
every five to six days” in California prisons between 2006 and 2007. Id. at 1925 n.4.
292
Id. at 1928.
293
Id.
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Amendment because they are inconsistent with how “decent” societies
294
treat even their most abhorred members.
The Court’s reasoning in so-called shock-the-conscience cases illustrates its commitment to collective virtue as dignity in yet another
context. In Rochin v. California, the Court held a search unconstitutional when police officers directed a physician to forcibly pump a
suspect’s stomach to collect evidence that the suspect was a narcotics
295
dealer who had swallowed his stash to avoid arrest. Justice Frankfurter, delivering the Court’s opinion, described the police conduct in
securing the evidence as “so brutal and so offensive to human digni296
ty” that it went beyond
some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combating crime too energetically. This is conduct that shocks the conscience.
Illegally breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open
his mouth and remove what was there, the forcible extraction of his stomach’s contents—this course of proceeding by agents of government to
297
obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities.

At first, Justice Frankfurter appeared primarily concerned with the
suspect’s liberty as dignity, which police violated when they intruded
into his home and manipulated his body without his consent. But this
gave way to a deeper concern about the implications of the State’s ac298
tions for collective virtue as dignity.
As the opinion continues,

294

Justice Ginsburg reiterated this view most recently in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, wherein
she noted that the harsh custodial conditions in which al-Kidd was kept were “a grim
reminder of the need to install safeguards against disrespect for human dignity, constraints that will control officialdom even in perilous times.” 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2089
(2011) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
295
342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952).
296
Id. at 174.
297
Id. at 172.
298
In Winston v. Lee, the Court prohibited a search that would have forced a robbery suspect to undergo surgery requiring general anesthesia to remove a bullet that
might have implicated him in a crime. 470 U.S. 753, 755 (1985). Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan noted that “‘[t]he overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the
State.’” Id. at 760 (alteration in original) (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 767 (1966)). In explaining the Court’s position that the suspect’s “dignitary interests in personal privacy and bodily integrity” outweighed the state’s interest in collecting evidence, id. at 761, Justice Brennan wrote that “drug[ing] this citizen . . . with
narcotics and barbiturates into a state of unconsciousness, and then . . . search[ing]
beneath his skin for evidence of a crime . . . involves a virtually total divestment of respondent’s ordinary control over surgical probing beneath his skin.” Id. at 765 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). In contrast to Justice Frankfurter’s
concern in Rochin that the extraction of evidence violated both liberty as dignity and
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Frankfurter famously said that there is little difference between forcing a confession from a suspect’s lips and forcing evidence from his
299
stomach. Both methods, he said, are “too close to the rack and the
300
screw to permit of constitutional differentiation.” In comparing the
State’s actions to torture, Frankfurter took care to point out that the
brutality inflicted on Rochin violated “the general requirement that
States in their prosecutions respect certain decencies of civilized con301
duct.”
In short, forcibly pumping Rochin’s stomach, like handcuffing Hope to a hitching post, threatens collective virtue as dignity by
suggesting that the civility we associate with our society and its members is unwarranted.
As noted at the outset of this section, however, the Court’s most
striking use of collective virtue as dignity appears in its recent abortion
jurisprudence. In Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court considered whether
the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, which prohibits a certain
302
303
The
method of performing late-term abortions, is constitutional.
Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act on the grounds that it
shows “respect for the dignity of human life” without unduly burden304
ing a woman’s choice to seek abortion.
In reaching this decision,
the Court not only conferred unprecedented influence on collective
virtue as dignity, but it also employed arguments to negate pregnant
women’s claims to liberty as dignity, on which prior abortion jurispru305
dence had largely rested.
En route to its conclusion, the Court detoured through an extensive and graphic depiction of the abortion procedure at issue. The
opinion described the procedure both as having “disturbing similarity
306
to the killing of a newborn infant” and as “gruesome and inhu307
mane.”
To defend its view that the banned procedure “devalue[s]
collective virtue as dignity, Justice Brennan relies only on liberty as dignity to deem the
search in Winston unconstitutional.
299
Rochin, 342 U.S. at 173.
300
Id. at 172.
301
Id. at 173.
302
18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006). The term “partial-birth abortion” is not a medical
term, but a political one crafted by anti-abortion advocates with the intent to incite
opposition to abortion generally. Siegel, supra note 32, at 1707-08. The medical term
for the procedure banned by the Act is “intact D&E” or “dilation and extraction.”
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 137 (2007).
303
550 U.S. 124, 132 (2007).
304
Id. at 157.
305
See supra subsection II.C.2.
306
Carhart, 550 U.S. at 158 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1531 note (2000)).
307
Id. at 141 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1531 note).
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308

human life,” the Court approvingly cited congressional findings that
“such a brutal and inhumane procedure . . . will further coarsen society to the humanity of not only newborns, but all vulnerable and inno309
cent human life.”
As in the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, Carhart invoked collective virtue as dignity to prohibit an activity that it concluded was out of sync with how a decent society demonstrates “re310
spect for the dignity of human life.”
Unlike the Casey plurality, the
Carhart majority did not weigh a woman’s liberty as dignity against the
state’s interest in respecting potential life to determine whether the
Act was constitutional. Instead, the Court embraced a strategy aligned
with its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to give priority to claims
grounded in our collective human dignity.
The Court’s separate discussion of whether pregnant women can
make rational decisions about abortion only further subordinates the
value of liberty as dignity. From the outset, Carhart had a different focus than the Court’s prior abortion decisions. References to women
311
do not appear until the fourth page of the Carhart opinion, and then
only as passive actors in medical procedures. Not until well over ten
pages into the opinion do women become participants in their medical
312
care. When the Court does turn to a woman’s decision, it concludes
(after admitting that it has no reliable data) that women may “come to
regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sus313
tained” and may suffer “severe depression and loss of esteem.”
In short, Carhart illustrates that liberty as dignity, and the women
who possess it, are playing an ever smaller role in the Court’s abortion
jurisprudence. In their place, the Court proffers collective virtue as dignity to vindicate what it views as our decency and humanity. This shift in
the Court’s emphasis serves as a reminder that “the content of human
dignity is a corollary of . . . cultural, political, constitutional, and other

308

Id. at 158.
Id. at 157.
310
Id.
311
Id. at 135-36.
312
Id. at 144.
313
Id. at 159. As Professor Reva Siegel has powerfully argued in her recent work,
there are good reasons to question why the Court cites affidavits suggesting that the
state ought to protect women from making uninformed decisions about abortion, particularly when those considerations did not weigh into Congress’ decision to enact the
ban. Siegel, supra note 32, at 1698-99.
309
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314

conditions, which can evolve and change in the course of history.”
Having a typology of dignity that can track these nuances offers the opportunity to better understand the doctrinal changes they produce.
CONCLUSION
This typology of dignity is not, to quote Wittgenstein, a “final anal315
In contrast to standard approaches
ysis of our forms of language.”
to defining dignity, the proposed framework does not offer a core,
fixed, or lasting concept of the term. Instead, it utilizes empirical data
to recognize that dignity’s conceptions and functions are dynamic and
context-driven. Understanding how the Court invokes dignity in practice, rather than in the abstract, serves as the basis of this typology and
allows it to maintain the flexibility to respond to evolutions and
changes in dignity’s usage.
In mapping the terrain of our current dignity discourse, the typology brings dignity’s judicial functions into greater relief. It reveals
the contexts in which the Court employs dignity to protect substantive
interests, and conversely, highlights the ways in which the Court’s view
of dignitary harms reshapes certain legal doctrines. By illustrating
that a set of pluralistic values often stand behind the Court’s use of
dignity, it gives coherence to what might otherwise appear to be vague, imprecise, and even ambiguous uses of the word. Most importantly, the typology provides us with the tools to evaluate what is at
stake, normatively and doctrinally, in a variety of contexts; it allows us
to detect dignity’s role in doctrinally transformative moments; and it
equips us with a framework for future discussions.

314

Doron Shultziner, Human Dignity—Functions and Meanings, 3 GLOBAL JURIST
TOPICS 1, 5 (2003).
315
WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 35, ¶ 91.
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APPENDIX
Table 1a. Justice Brennan’s Majority Opinions
Invoking the Word “Dignity”
Date

Case Name

Citation

1989

Texas v. Johnson

491 U.S. 397

1985

Winston v. Lee

470 U.S. 753

1984

Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees

468 U.S. 609

1978

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.

436 U.S. 658

1977

Califano v. Goldfarb

430 U.S. 199

1974

Steffel v. Thompson

415 U.S. 452

1971

Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.

403 U.S. 29

1970

Goldberg v. Kelly

397 U.S. 254

1966

Schmerber v. California

384 U.S. 757

1965

Dombrowski v. Pfister

380 U.S. 479

1964

N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan

376 U.S. 254

1959

Abbate v. United States

359 U.S. 187

Table 1b. Justice Brennan’s Concurring Opinions
Invoking the Word “Dignity”
Date

Case Name

Citation

1988

City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik

485 U.S. 112

1987

United States v. Stanley

483 U.S. 669

1987

Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co.

482 U.S. 656

1981

Rhodes v. Chapman

452 U.S. 337

1979

Herbert v. Lando

441 U.S. 153

1973

Hurtado v. United States

410 U.S. 578

1972

Furman v. Georgia

408 U.S. 238

1970

Illinois v. Allen

397 U.S. 337

1963

Ker v. California

374 U.S. 23
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Table 1c. Justice Brennan’s Dissenting Opinions
Invoking the Word “Dignity”
Date

Case Name

Citation
316

1990

Lewis v. Jeffers

1990

Walton v. Arizona

497 U.S. 639

1990

Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health

497 U.S. 261

1989

Stanford v. Kentucky

492 U.S. 361

1989

Florida v. Riley

488 U.S. 445

1987

O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz

482 U.S. 342

1986

Colorado v. Connelly

479 U.S. 157

1986

Goldman v. Weinberger

475 U.S. 503

1985

United States v. Montoya
de Hernandez

473 U.S. 531

1985

Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc.

472 U.S. 749

1983

Jones v. Barnes

463 U.S. 745

1976

United States v. Martinez-Fuerte

428 U.S. 543

1976

Gregg v. Georgia

428 U.S. 227

1976

Estelle v. Williams

425 U.S. 501

1976

Paul v. Davis

424 U.S. 693

1976

Time, Inc. v. Firestone

424 U.S. 448

1975

United States v. Wilson

421 U.S. 309

1971

Harris v. New York

401 U.S. 222

316

497 U.S. 764

The Supreme Court decided Lewis v. Jeffers and Walton v. Arizona on the same
day. While Justice Brennan’s dissent can be found in Walton, it also applies to Lewis.
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Table 2. Opinions Invoking the Word “Dignity” During
the Tenure of the Roberts Court
Date

Case Name

Citation

2011

Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.

131 S. Ct. 2653

2011

Bond v. United States

131 S. Ct. 2355

2011

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd

131 S. Ct. 2074

2011

Brown v. Plata

131 S. Ct. 1910

2011

Sossamon v. Texas

131 S. Ct. 1651

2011

Va. Office for Prot. &
Advocacy v. Stewart

131 S. Ct. 1632

2010

McDonald v. City of Chicago

130 S. Ct. 3020

2010

Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter
of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings
Coll. of the Law v. Martinez

130 S. Ct. 2971

2010

City of Ontario v. Quon

130 S. Ct. 2619

2010

Barber v. Thomas

130 S. Ct. 2499

2010

Alabama v. North Carolina

130 S. Ct. 2295

2010

Samantar v. Yousuf

130 S. Ct. 2278

2010

Citizens United v. FEC

130 S. Ct. 876

2010

South Carolina v. North Carolina

130 S. Ct. 854

2010

Wellons v. Hall

130 S. Ct. 727

2010

Hollingsworth v. Perry

130 S. Ct. 705

2009

Beard v. Kindler

130 S. Ct. 612

2009

Herring v. United States

555 U.S. 135

2008

Kennedy v. Louisiana

554 U.S. 407

2008

Plains Commerce Bank v. Long
Family Land & Cattle Co.

554 U.S. 316

2008

Indiana v. Edwards

554 U.S. 164

2008

Republic of Phil. v. Pimentel

553 U.S. 851

2008

Virginia v. Moore

553 U.S. 164
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Date

Case Name

Citation

2008

Baze v. Rees

553 U.S. 35

2007

Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1

551 U.S. 701

2007

Gonzales v. Carhart

550 U.S. 124

2007

Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.

550 U.S. 1

2007

Massachusetts v. EPA

549 U.S. 497

2006

Carey v. Musladin

549 U.S. 70

2006

Beard v. Banks

548 U.S. 521

2006

Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Murphy

548 U.S. 291

2006

Woodford v. Ngo

548 U.S. 81

2006

Hudson v. Michigan

547 U.S. 586

2005

Wagnon v. Prairie Band
Potawatomi Nation

546 U.S. 95

